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ABSTRACT
Leadership Engagement for Military Hospitals: A Case Study of the Effects of Executive
Leader Engagement in Military Hospitals That Have Become
High Reliability Organizations
by Russell Phillips IV
Purpose: The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and explain the
leadership strategies that military hospital executive leaders used to engage hospital staff
in implementing the six principles of High Reliability Organizations (HROs).
Methodology: A qualitative case study approach was selected for this study. Interviews
were conducted with three executive leaders describing their experiences with initiating
and managing the change development of HRO. The participants in this study were
executive leaders of military hospitals across the Puget Sound Military Health System.
All participants had direct experience with the implementation of HRO. Interview
transcripts were analyzed and reviewed for themes and trends.
Findings: Examination of the study data from military hospital executive leaders
participating in this study indicated that executive leaders used similar strategies to
implement the six HRO principles. Strategies that promoted the HRO principles of
preoccupation with failure, commitment to resiliency, sensitivity to operations, deference
to expertise, reluctance to accept simple explanations for problems, and creating a strong
safety culture were identified as being helpful and engaging of staff with the
implementation of HRO.
Conclusions: There were four conclusions drawn from this study based on the data. The
results of this study support the conclusion that reveals executive leaders used strategies
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that helped them engage staff in implementing all six HRO principles, and finding the
right strategies for leaders to use is certainly dependent on resources available.
Recommendations: Further research recommendations include (a) exploring how first
line leaders implement and maintain an HRO within military hospitals, (b) exploring how
executive leaders implement and maintain an HRO within a similar military healthcare
system of hospitals, (c) exploring a comparison study between military hospitals and
civilian hospitals, (d) examining the lived experiences and perceptions of leaders who
have worked in both hospitals that have implemented HROs and hospitals that have not,
(e) replicating this study focusing on only one of the military hospitals in the Puget
Sound Military Health System, (f) examining the lived experiences and perceptions of
leaders who have worked in both hospitals that have implemented HROs and other
industries that have implemented HROs.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1
Background.......................................................................................................................... 3
History of the Healthcare Industry in the United States ................................................ 3
The challenges of providing care in hospitals. ........................................................ 4
Civilian hospitals ..................................................................................................... 5
Military hospitals. .................................................................................................... 6
The Studer Group’s High Reliability Organization Foundation ................................... 7
HRO hospitals. ........................................................................................................ 8
Military HRO hospitals. .......................................................................................... 9
Commitment of Hospital Leadership ............................................................................ 9
Military Hospital Leadership ....................................................................................... 10
Initiation and Implementation of Change .................................................................... 10
The Cost Associated With High Reliability Organizations ......................................... 11
Research Gap ............................................................................................................... 12
Statement of the Research Problem ................................................................................... 13
Purpose Statement ............................................................................................................. 15
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 15
Significance of the Problem .............................................................................................. 15
Definitions ......................................................................................................................... 17
Delimitations ..................................................................................................................... 19
Organization of the Study .................................................................................................. 19
CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ........................................................... 21
Complexities in Healthcare ............................................................................................... 22
High Reliability Organizations .......................................................................................... 23
High Reliability Principle: Preoccupation With Failure ............................................. 24
High Reliability Principle: Commitment to Resilience ............................................... 25
High Reliability Principle: Sensitivity to Operations .................................................. 25
High Reliability Principle: Deference to Expertise ..................................................... 26
High Reliability Principle: Reluctance to Simplify ..................................................... 26
High Reliability Principle: Strong Safety Culture ....................................................... 27
Additional Analysis ..................................................................................................... 27
Application of High Reliability Organization in Industry ................................................. 27
History of Healthcare ........................................................................................................ 29
Cost of Healthcare ....................................................................................................... 30
Services Provided to Patients ...................................................................................... 31
Collaboration of Care to Improve Quality of Care ...................................................... 31
Staffing and Equipment Required ............................................................................... 31
Patient Populations ...................................................................................................... 31
Healthcare Policies and Laws ............................................................................................ 32
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ................................................................ 32
National Defense Authorization Act ........................................................................... 33
Civilian Healthcare ............................................................................................................ 34
Military Healthcare ............................................................................................................ 34
Military First Level of Care (Role 1) .......................................................................... 34
viii

Military Second Level of Care (Role 2) ...................................................................... 35
Military Third Level of Care (Role 3) ......................................................................... 35
Military Fourth Level of Care (Role 4) ....................................................................... 36
Major Change in Military Healthcare................................................................................ 36
High Reliability Hospitals ................................................................................................. 37
Training Involved ........................................................................................................ 38
Mitigating Risk ............................................................................................................ 38
Preventative Measures ................................................................................................. 39
High Reliability in Civilian Hospitals ............................................................................... 39
High Reliability in Military Hospitals ............................................................................... 40
Impact on Military Mission ......................................................................................... 40
Healthcare Outcomes................................................................................................... 41
Tools for High Reliability ........................................................................................... 41
Hospital Leadership ........................................................................................................... 43
Leadership Engagement .............................................................................................. 43
Executive Teams ......................................................................................................... 44
Military Hospital Leadership ....................................................................................... 44
Leadership Structure .................................................................................................... 44
Kotter’s Eight-Stage Change Theory ................................................................................ 48
Establishing a Sense of Urgency ................................................................................. 48
Creating the Guiding Coalition ................................................................................... 49
Developing a Vision Strategy ...................................................................................... 49
Communicating the Change Vision............................................................................. 50
Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action ...................................................... 50
Generating Short-Term Wins ...................................................................................... 51
Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change ..................................................... 51
Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture ................................................................ 52
Summary............................................................................................................................ 52
Synthesis Matrix ................................................................................................................ 54
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 55
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 55
Purpose Statement ............................................................................................................. 55
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 55
Research Design ................................................................................................................ 56
Qualitative Design ....................................................................................................... 56
Case Study Design ....................................................................................................... 57
Population .......................................................................................................................... 57
Sampling Frame................................................................................................................. 58
Sample ............................................................................................................................... 59
Instrumentation .................................................................................................................. 61
The Researcher ............................................................................................................ 61
Validity ........................................................................................................................ 63
Field Testing ................................................................................................................ 64
Reliability .................................................................................................................... 65
Data Collection .................................................................................................................. 65
Human Subject Consideration ........................................................................................... 65
ix

Data Analysis..................................................................................................................... 67
Limitations ......................................................................................................................... 68
Summary............................................................................................................................ 68
CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH, DATA COLLECTION, AND FINDINGS ....................... 69
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 69
Purpose Statement ............................................................................................................. 69
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 69
Research Methods and Data Collection Procedures .......................................................... 70
Population .......................................................................................................................... 71
Sampling Frame................................................................................................................. 72
Sample ............................................................................................................................... 73
Demographic Data ............................................................................................................. 74
Presentation and Analysis of Data ..................................................................................... 75
Data by Research Question ............................................................................................... 76
Data Analysis for Research Question 1 ....................................................................... 79
Data Analysis for Research Question 2 ....................................................................... 82
Data Analysis for Research Question 3 ....................................................................... 85
Data Analysis for Research Question 4 ....................................................................... 87
Data Analysis for Research Question 5 ....................................................................... 90
Data Analysis for Research Question 6 ....................................................................... 92
Summary............................................................................................................................ 95
CHAPTER V: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............. 97
Purpose Statement ............................................................................................................. 97
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 97
Research Methods and Data Collection Procedures .......................................................... 98
Population .......................................................................................................................... 99
Sampling Frame................................................................................................................. 99
Sample ............................................................................................................................. 101
Major Findings ................................................................................................................ 102
Major Finding 1: Preoccupation With Failure Requires Resources .......................... 102
Major Finding 2: Resiliency is Fundamental ............................................................ 103
Major Finding 3: Reporting Needs to be Simple....................................................... 104
Major Finding 4: Trust the Experts ........................................................................... 104
Major Finding 5: Policies Provide Solutions............................................................. 105
Major Finding 6: Improved Patient Safety Trends .................................................... 106
Unexpected Findings ....................................................................................................... 106
Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 108
Conclusion 1: Understanding the Importance of Executive Leaders’
Experiences and the Invaluable Insight They Provide for Implementing
HRO ................................................................................................................. 108
Conclusion 2: Analyzing Mistakes Made Within an HRO Help Executive
Leaders Promote Resiliency ............................................................................ 108
Conclusion 3: Analyzing Policies May Provide Other Executive Leaders With
Insight on How to Prevent Errors .................................................................... 109

x

Conclusion 4: Understanding the Importance of Continual Education and
Sticking with the HRO Principles .................................................................... 109
Implications for Action.................................................................................................... 110
Implication for Action 1: Resources Required to Sustain HRO................................ 110
Implication for Action 2: Peer Support Program ...................................................... 110
Implication for Action 3: HRO Training Program .................................................... 111
Implication for Action 4: Organizational Development Leader ................................ 111
Recommendations for Further Research ......................................................................... 112
Recommendation 1 .................................................................................................... 112
Recommendation 2 .................................................................................................... 112
Recommendation 3 .................................................................................................... 113
Recommendation 4 .................................................................................................... 113
Recommendation 5 .................................................................................................... 113
Recommendation 6 .................................................................................................... 114
Concluding Remarks and Reflections ............................................................................. 114
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 116
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................. 127

xi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Military Hospital HRO Tools ............................................................................. 42
Table 2. Participant Demographics .................................................................................. 75
Table 3. Research Question 1 Interview Results .............................................................. 79
Table 4. Research Question 2 Interview Results .............................................................. 82
Table 5. Research Question 3 Interview Results .............................................................. 86
Table 6. Research Question 4 Interview Results .............................................................. 88
Table 7. Research Question 5 Interview Results ............................................................. 90
Table 8. Research Question 6 Interview Results ............................................................. 92

xii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Enabling factor counts across the three stages ................................................... 24
Figure 2. Civilian hospital organizational model. ............................................................. 45
Figure 3. Military hospital organizational model .............................................................. 46
Figure 4. Kotter’s change model in healthcare .................................................................. 47
Figure 5. Kotter’s 8-step model ......................................................................................... 48
Figure 6. Convergence of evidence ................................................................................... 63
Figure 7. Number of themes that emerged in each HRO principle. .................................. 77
Figure 8. Total number of frequencies for each HRO principle. ....................................... 78
Figure 9. Themes and frequencies for being preoccupied with failure. ............................ 80
Figure 10. Themes and frequencies of commitment to resiliency..................................... 83
Figure 11. Theme and frequency of sensitivity to operations. .......................................... 87
Figure 12. Themes and frequencies of deference to expertise .......................................... 89
Figure 13. Themes and frequencies of reluctance to accept simple explanations for
problems. ............................................................................................................... 91
Figure 14. Themes and frequencies of creating a strong safety culture. ........................... 93

xiii

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
In the healthcare industry, errors and mistakes in patient care happen daily. Those
errors and mistakes have the potential for serious consequences such as the loss of human
life (Klevens et al., 2007). According to Quigley and White (2013), hospitals tend not to
publicize the fact that they have, on average, two patient care incidents daily. Those
incidents bear the potential to improve patient care provided that hospital staff are able to
deal with the errors being shared in an adaptive and reflexive manner (Tulis, Steuer, &
Dresel, 2016). Hospital leaders want their beneficiaries to know that they can handle the
complexities that go on daily in the hospital and that they can ensure quality and safe
patient care is provided (Klevens et al., 2007). Healthcare initiatives that focus on
reducing the number of errors and mistakes that happen have been developed. The
healthcare industry has been reluctant to embrace new initiatives because of the
education, training, and cost associated with implementing them (Oster & Deakins, 2018;
Oster, Sigma Theta Tau, & Braaten, 2016).
A major change initiative that public and private sector organizations are using is
the High Reliability Organization (HRO) initiative (Casler, 2014). HROs are successful
in avoiding major errors in an environment where the risk of error is high because of the
complexity of the work and where an error could cause great harm (Stichler, 2017).
Examples of HROs are nuclear power plants, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the United States Armed Forces, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and hospitals (Valerio, 2006). High reliability is the science of
achieving efficient, error-free operation (Studer, 2008). That means that a hospital HRO
is an organization that uses predictable and repeatable systems that allow for the
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consistent execution of operations while catching and correcting potentially catastrophic
errors (Casler, 2014).
Since 2009, the Joint Commission has required leadership of all hospitals in the
United States, including military hospitals, to follow HRO initiatives that “create and
maintain a culture of safety” (Chassin & Loeb, 2013, Adapting High-Reliability Science
to Hospitals section, para. 4). The Joint Commission’s purpose is to provide hospitals
with national accreditation and certification as a symbol of quality that reflects their
organization’s commitment to meeting certain performance standards (The Joint
Commission, n.d). An estimated 20,000 hospitals have initiated such HRO processes.
According to Kotter (2012), most public and private organizations can be significantly
improved at an acceptable cost but often make the mistake of repeating their history
because leaders are not prepared for the transformational challenges that come with
change. Understanding what is necessary for hospital leadership to initiate an HRO
change and maintain an HRO change could have a tremendous impact on hospital
leadership practices and the healthcare industry.
Exploring the specific leadership ideas and critical concepts of HRO initiatives in
military hospitals may lead to improved military healthcare. There is a high demand for
transformational leadership that creates and fosters a “just culture” for employees
(Frankel, Leonard, & Denham, 2006). Considering the number of errors that happen
daily in the healthcare industry, it is easy to conclude that there is a need for
transformational leadership in hospitals. Furthermore, there is little research that has
explored military hospital leaders’ experiences of initiating and implementing HRO
initiatives given the nearly 20,000 hospitals that have initiated such a process. For
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military healthcare to continue to improve, strong leadership is needed to sustain HRO
implementation initiatives (Callahan, 2013).
Background
The healthcare industry is one of the world’s largest industries and vastly growing
because people need more healthcare and access to healthcare and because of the aging
population who is retiring. In spite of the increasing healthcare needs, quality and safety
are the major pillars that drive the daily work in more than 20,000 U.S. hospital
organizations (Chassin & Loeb, 2011). Many healthcare initiatives have been employed
in previous years to help improve the delivery of quality and safety in hospitals. Some
healthcare initiatives have even become law. The most commonly known initiative that
turned into law is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; Mittler,
Martsolf, Telenko, & Scanlon, 2013). This healthcare initiative alone increased the
coverage of healthcare and set standards for how hospitals could operate. There is also
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; Daniel & Posnack, 2009). This
law was set to help preserve and create jobs in support of the American welfare to include
incentives in healthcare. Researchers have proved that this healthcare initiative improved
financial and clinical outcomes while other healthcare initiatives showed equivocal
results on both sets of metrics (Thompson et al., 2015).
History of the Healthcare Industry in the United States
Knowledge about the history of the modern healthcare industry goes back
approximately 100 years for both the public and private healthcare industries. There are
many aspects to the healthcare history grounded in the economy, politics, power
structures, and culture of global medicine (Stevens, 2008). Some of the first major
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healthcare reforms were initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s
(Geyman, 2018). According to Stevens (2008), when politics changed the way Medicaid
worked in the 2000s, hospitals had to look for alternative ways to provide the same
quality care to their aging patients in primary care and specialty care clinics.
The challenges of providing care in hospitals. Hospitals provide medical
treatment to patients and offer a wide range of medical services through specialized
physicians, nursing staff, and various medical devices. Research has referred to hospitals
as being places where patients can receive emergency medicine, primary care, surgery,
internal medicine, and the full spectrum variety of other medical services from nurses,
physicians, and other healthcare professionals (Gartmeier, Ottl, Bauer, & Berberat, 2017).
Hospitals have many different departments that work in sync to provide collaborated care
for patients to ensure quality and safety.
A major challenge is that there is no formal national health policy in the United
States guaranteeing the care of patients:
Federal law requires hospitals to treat those who enter their emergency
rooms, but not for free. Military veterans are offered care in health
facilities supported by federal tax dollars, in a generally well-regarded
program that is not open to the general population. The national Medicare
program provides government-sponsored health insurance for specified
services to those 65 years of age and over, and to individuals of all ages
certified as disabled. However, Medicare is limited by its demographics
and does not provide health services; these are overwhelmingly purchased
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in the private sector, with bills paid by Medicare at specified rates, on
behalf of beneficiaries. (Stevens, 2008, p. 462)
However, most hospitals provide care to all types of beneficiaries regardless of
military preference, age, or diagnosis (Stevens, 2008). Hospitals can be rather
large and associated with universities and others are small and community based.
All hospitals try to have robust emergency services, but depending on a hospital’s
capabilities, some offer more emergency services than others. Hospitals that offer
more services are oftentimes referred to from others for special invasive
procedures and services (Gartmeier et al., 2017).
Civilian hospitals. All hospitals have some sort of structure and culture
that caters to their staff and patient community. The most common structure of
civilian hospitals or community hospitals is that they are structured like a
traditional corporation with a C-suite of executives (Groves, 2019). This structure
consists of executives such as chief executive officers, chief operation officers,
and chief nursing officers who are required to run a hospital successfully (Myers,
2012). This structure requires that all executives, either medical or
administrative, work as a governing body and as an administration in a
collaborative fashion and agree together on how to accomplish work throughout
the hospital (Myers, 2012).
The culture of a hospital also plays a major role in how leaders operate the
hospital. For example, in a civilian hospital in Houston, Texas, culture is
displayed through staff remaining patient centered in all that they do to provide
the best patient care possible (Masi, 2007). Having this kind of culture gives

5

leaders the ability to lead and a staff willing to follow (Masi, 2007). Civilian
hospitals have similarities to military hospitals given that they have a culture that
promotes autonomy, teamwork, and administrative operations that are applied
through innovative concepts, interpersonal relationships, and hierarchical
structure (Frankel et al., 2006).
Military hospitals. The U.S. military hospitals all operate differently
than their community counterparts. Military hospitals must follow Congressmandated guidance. According to Khan (2018),
With the recent passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA), Congress has triggered groundbreaking
Military Health System (MHS) organizational restructuring with the
Defense Health Agency (DHA) assuming responsibility for managing all
hospitals and clinics owned by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. (p. 56)
There are some military hospitals larger than others and some in small
communities heavily populated with military personnel. The same medical
services are provided in military hospitals as in community counterpart hospitals.
The major distinctions that separate military hospitals from all other hospitals are
the facts that they are run by military leadership, funded by Congress, and only
treat military beneficiaries (Khan, 2018). Retired military beneficiaries who have
Medicaid can only receive limited services in military hospitals. Military
hospitals have a primary mission to conserve the fighting force (Smith, Bono, &
Slinger, 2017). Military beneficiaries face their own unique set of problems not
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seen in civilian hospitals because of the consistent deployments and war
casualties.
The Studer Group’s High Reliability Organization Foundation
The healthcare industry is an industry that is continuously evolving and
innovating due to the studies that healthcare professionals are doing to provide the best
healthcare they can for their patients. Emmert, Meszmer, and Sander (2016) showed in
their study that more than half of nearly 2,130 surveyed healthcare providers across the
United States use online ratings systems to develop measures to increase the quality of
patient care they can provide. This method of gathering feedback and evolving it into a
collaborative care model with patients helps healthcare providers care for their patients
more effectively. Researchers have engaged in many initiatives to improve healthcare.
According to Schuller, Kash, Edwardson, and Gamm (2013), over 800 healthcare
organizations have participated in a Studer initiative, which provides coaches who help
establish a framework to align the goals, actions, and processes of the organization and
provide the foundation for transformation of healthcare delivery. The HRO initiative is
one of those healthcare initiatives being referred too. HROs are defined as “organizations
that require nearly error-free operations all the time because otherwise they are capable of
experiencing catastrophes” (Milosevic, Bass, & Combs, 2018, p. 1175). Catastrophes
have been described as causing great damage or suffering and could even mean death to
human life or the destruction of nature. HROs emphasize reinforcing policies and
procedures to ensure an organization is as error free as possible. Two essential
characteristics that HROs must have to enforce such policies and procedures are
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explicating complexity and tight couplings because they are more time dependent
processes with little slack (Roberts, 1990b).
HROs are successful in avoiding major errors in their environments because of
the serious nature of their mission (Stichler, 2017). Examples of HROs are nuclear
power plants, NASA, United States Navy aircraft carriers, FAA, and hospitals (Valerio,
2006). High reliability is the science of achieving efficient, error-free operation
(Matiella, 2011). A hospital, as an HRO, would strive for perfect healthcare for its
patients. An HRO hospital uses predictable and repeatable systems that allow for the
consistent execution of operations while catching and correcting potentially catastrophic
errors (Casler, 2014). Hospitals that have chosen to become HROs have as their mission
to avoid significant harm to their organizations and the people they serve.
HRO hospitals. The leadership and staff of an HRO hospital has the vision to
avoid major healthcare errors in patient care. According to Chassin and Loeb (2011,
2013), the foundation of high reliability in hospitals is to improve patient safety and
quality performance through preventative strategies, robust process improvement
programs, and the engagement of staff to speak up on safety concerns and participate in
developing strategies to mitigate risks in patient care. Also, hospital HRO models seek to
show an increase in auditing, testing, training, and monitoring and in redundancy of
systems as well as of manpower and structure (Hunt, 2006). Similar to other
organizations, HRO hospitals strive for efficiency and zero errors through structure and
order much like military hospitals. Hospital HRO changes require strong leadership and
support to initiate and maintain this type of an initiative.
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Military HRO hospitals. The military healthcare system is one of the largest
healthcare systems in the world, providing medical services to millions of service
members at an estimated 700 military HRO hospitals and clinics around the globe (Smith
et al., 2017). According to Smith et al. (2017), military hospitals were found to value
quality, safety, experiences, and outcomes rather than volume and intensity through
value-based pilots and demonstration projects that target savings and value creation
through patient-defined and clinical outcomes. They have achieved such results by
taking risks with developing people, harnessing new informatics resources, and exploring
novel technologies that impact health outcome, quality, and costs (Khan, 2018). Similar
to other HRO hospitals, military HRO hospitals strive to prevent mistakes and errors with
their structure and leadership.
Commitment of Hospital Leadership
Leadership engagement is a leader's ability to be aware of the organization while
being cognizant of the interactions among the staff. Hospital leaders, especially those
who are at the top of the organization, need to provide the organizations’ full
commitment for all healthcare initiatives being introduced. Hospital leaders’ most
valuable commodity is their ability to inspire staff to initiate major changes and to
provide them support through all the change stages (Vizzuso, 2015). According to
Croxton (2011), leaders must honestly communicate even the nuances of change to their
staff and call upon them to help make tough decisions. Leadership engagement focuses
on the leader’s ability to interact with superiors, subordinates, and peers alike.
Engagement of staff at all levels, from chief executive officer to custodians, within an
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organization could potentially lead to more success in the implementation of the HRO
initiative at hospitals (Vaughn et al., 2006).
Military Hospital Leadership
Military hospital leadership follows a similar model and structure to its civilian
counterpart. This model is called the Health Executive Leadership Organization
Structure (HELOS) in the military. There are 10 directorates, each led as deputy
commanders for nursing, dentistry, surgery, medicine, behavioral health, clinical support
services, administration, healthcare operations, training/education/research, and
readiness/operations (Callahan, 2013). The deputy commanders work collaboratively
with the commander who is equivalent to the community counterparts CEO. The
HELOS model makes the decision-making process more of a team approach by
developing many different committees and chairs for governing changes. Each
leadership position in the HELOS model has a narrower span of control, allowing for a
more focused mastery of a specific area of hospital operations (Callahan, 2013).
According to Callahan (2013), the HELOS model “provides the leader more time and
energy to focus on the subtle but equally important aspects of leadership, including
subordinate development, strategic communication, and executive rounding” (p. 63). All
10 leaders in the HELOS model have the ability to start and stop change initiatives
similar to HRO initiatives.
Initiation and Implementation of Change
HRO initiation and implementation of change can only start if a hospital is
planning for the change and the leadership is committed to the change. According to
Studer (2008),
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Before embarking on an HRO journey, an organization must develop a strategic
plan that provides details and milestones on how and when to reach degrees and
levels of high reliability performance. The plan must include all the essential
components—goals and objectives, policies and procedures, timelines and
tollgates, techniques, and so on—for assessing needs, implementing improved
procedures, training team members, upgrading technology, and sustaining
performance and quality for the long term. (p. 66)
Getting leaderships’ support for the idea of an HRO is an absolute must. Following a
process to change, like Kotter’s (2012) eight-stage change theory, will ensure leaders
have the road map for making HROs work. There is even a high demand for
transformational leadership that creates and fosters a just culture for employees (Frankel
et al., 2006). Considering the number of errors that happen daily within the healthcare
industry, it can be concluded that there is a need for transformational leadership in
hospitals. Military HRO hospital leaders championing the initiative will help ensure the
change is successful (Smith et al., 2017). Most organizational changes will have
implications of how the organization is supposed to operate during the change.
The Cost Associated With High Reliability Organizations
Becoming an HRO can be quite costly. Much like other healthcare initiatives,
organizations implementing the HRO initiative will require additional training, resources,
and staff to ensure the initiative is a success. HROs are defined as “organizations that
require nearly error-free operations all the time because otherwise they are capable of
experiencing catastrophes” (Milosevic et al., 2018, p. 1175). The quality of care
provided by HRO practices is suggested to outweigh the cost associated with the need to
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enable reliable performance in high-risk, complex environments such as healthcare
(Hunt, 2006; Matiella, 2011; Oster & Deakins, 2018; Oster et al., 2016).
The HRO initiative follows sustainable premises to help determine and predict
catastrophes in healthcare and improve the quality of care provided. Casler (2014) stated,
“In part, sustainability assumes that the cost to achieve reliability is worth the benefit of
improved reliability” (p. 231). The outcomes of HROs are intended to demonstrate an
approach that healthcare organizations, charged with transformational leaders of
advanced medicine in the best interest of patients, may make informed decisions
regarding risk and effectively avoid catastrophic consequences (Casler, 2014). The HRO
initiative is costly in terms of increased overhead in auditing, testing, training, and
monitoring and in redundancy of systems as well as of manpower and structure (Casler,
2014).
Many studies to date confirm the premises of the HRO initiative, pointing to the
validity of the theory’s quality improvements of healthcare organizations (Hunt, 2006;
Matiella, 2011; Oster & Deakins, 2018; Oster et al., 2016). This conclusion should be
tempered by the limited number of studies about cost associated with implementing the
HRO initiative. Nevertheless, more research on the HRO initiative’s cost is needed to
draw a firm conclusion that it is indeed too costly (Casler, 2014).
Research Gap
Military hospital leadership may be vital to advancing military medicine and
implementing HRO initiatives that bring military hospitals into the 21st century within
the healthcare industry. The centralized leadership models of military hospitals, under
the authority of new laws afford them an opportunity to focus on readiness; provide a
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standard, high-quality experience for patients; and eliminate redundancies (Khan, 2018).
Exploring the leadership strategies used to transform military hospitals into HROs and
change the process for which leaders went through to support HRO initiatives in military
hospitals may lead to proven outcomes and more collaborative care ideas in healthcare
within the healthcare industry. Furthermore, given the nearly 20,000 hospitals that have
initiated such a process, there is little research that has explored military hospital leaders’
experiences with initiating and implementing HRO initiatives. For military healthcare to
continue to improve, strong leadership is needed to initiate and manage change, and the
development of change in HRO initiatives has to be implemented.
Statement of the Research Problem
Hospitals have been plagued with the fact that there is no formal healthcare policy
guaranteeing the care of patients (Stevens, 2008). Instead, a number of healthcare
initiatives have been examined, and one (HRO) has been adopted by the Joint
Commission (Chassin & Loeb, 2013). Innovations in the area of quality and safety have
been the primary focus of studies in recent years; however, the Joint Commission is one
accreditation body in the United States and limited in its abilities to study the leadership
concepts of HROs (Ford, 2018).
In the United States, there has been some movement toward all hospitals
providing the highest quality of care and patient safety using HRO initiatives (Hunt,
2006). In 2002, approximately 1.7 million patients died in hospitals, including military
hospitals, because of healthcare-associated infections (Klevens et al., 2007). This is a
significant improvement from the 1.9 million patients who died in hospitals in 1995
(Klevens et al., 2007). Moreover, guided HRO principles provide leaders with a
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foundation and pillars for particular ways to address quality and safety in healthcare
(Studer, 2008).
Literature related to military hospitals has examined the beginnings of a redesign
of military hospital leadership and organizational structure (Callahan, 2013). Recent
research has indicated that traditional methods of healthcare are insufficient with the
complexities of care needed, and improvement will require transformational leaders who
understand the barriers and drivers for change (Kotter, 2012; Vaughn et al., 2006). For
example, the failure to use evidence-based interventions may occur in five of 10 patients
within many military hospitals, which lead to potential errors (Hunt, 2006). Military
leaders need to be adept to a more engaging approach for outcomes for HRO change
efforts to work (Frankel et al., 2006). Moreover, executive leaders need to think
holistically when restructuring and managing development of change in HRO initiatives
implemented.
Achieving high reliability should be the main goal of every military hospital
leader (Hadi Mousavi et al., 2018). Military hospital executive teams should make
decisions based on achieving long-term goals of becoming a zero error organization
(Khan, 2018). Zero error organizations embrace the notion of having zero errors,
mistakes, or defects (Oster et al., 2016). Leaders who focus on zero error invariably
uncover many different ideas, enabling innovation and resulting in measures and designs
that are successful. Little research to date has examined military hospital leaders’
experiences of initiating and implementing HRO initiatives. For this study,
understanding how military hospital leaders in the Puget Sound Military Health System
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implemented HRO initiatives provides insights based on direct experiences with this
healthcare change initiative.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and explain the
leadership strategies that military hospital executive leaders use to engage hospital staff
in implementation of the six principles of HROs.
Research Questions
1. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was preoccupied with
failure?
2. What strategies did executive leaders use to commit to resiliency?
3. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was sensitive to
operations?
4. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was deference to
expertise?
5. What strategies did executive leaders use to be reluctant to accept simple explanations
for problems?
6. What strategies did executive leaders use to create a strong safety culture?
Significance of the Problem
According to Spaulding, Gamm, and Griffith (2010), there is evidence that
healthcare initiatives similar to HRO initiatives have been associated with significant
accomplishments by the number of healthcare organizations that won the Baldrige Award
during the past decade. Notably, a majority of the large-scale healthcare systems in the
United States have implemented HRO initiatives. However, like Lean Six Sigma, the
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formal evaluation of the HRO initiatives in healthcare organizations is limited, yet
military hospitals have started to adopt this initiative because of the considerable amount
of research that has been done on the need for new healthcare initiatives in hospitals
(Khan, 2018; Vest & Gamm, 2009).
Research in the healthcare industry is filled with studies on the delivery of quality
and safety in patient care. Most of these studies are designed to increase the prevention
of errors and mistakes made while performing patient care (Milosevic et al., 2018). In
recognizing the critical role leaders have in quality and safety, many healthcare initiatives
similar to HRO initiatives have developed guided principles to provide leaders with a
foundation and pillars for particular ways to address quality and safety in healthcare
(Studer, 2008). However, there has been limited study of how hospital’s executive
leaders and other organizational leaders navigate the guided pathways of implementation
and maintenance of HRO initiatives (Spaulding et al., 2010).
Governance issues discussed in relation to the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) tie the hands of leaders and are pushing for the restructuring of military
hospitals (Khan, 2018). Despite the issues, military hospital leaders are beginnings to
redesign their organizational structures (Callahan, 2013). Through transformational
leadership styles, leaders will naturally take more engaging approaches for HRO
initiatives to reach their long-term goals (Frankel et al., 2006). This study addresses the
gap in research and helps identify the unique drivers and barriers that are vital to the
HRO initiatives faced by military hospital leaders.
Ultimately, this research has the potential to provide a clearer understanding of
the change processes and decision-making of military hospital leaders who implemented
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and maintained HRO initiatives. There are over 250,000 people who are killed annually
by preventable medical mistakes, and the commitment toward attaining high reliability
status must begin with executive leadership and be communicated as a significant culture
change throughout the organization (Marshall, 2016). Military hospital leaders may use
the findings of this research to gain a greater awareness of how leadership is directly
connected with the quality and safety of patient care through HRO initiatives.
Definitions
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). ARRA is the economic
stimulus packaged enacted by Congress intended to preserve and create jobs in support of
the American welfare to include incentives in healthcare and education (Daniel &
Posnack, 2009).
Commitment to resilience. Commitment to resilience focuses on an
organization’s ability to bounce back from making errors and mistakes.
Deference to expertise. Deference to expertise focuses on leaders listening to
and responding to others’ insights, regardless of rank, position, or title (Bonser, n.d.).
Demonstration projects. Demonstration projects target savings and value
creation through patient-defined and clinical outcomes (Khan, 2018; Smith et al., 2017).
Executive leader. An executive leader position title is equivalent to community
hospital directors, chief executives, or adjunct senior leadership positions.
Healthcare industry. The healthcare industry is one of the world’s largest
industries that focuses on the delivery of medicine to patients worldwide.
Healthcare initiative. The healthcare initiative is a leadership approach that
causes change in healthcare, which improves the delivery of care to patients.
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High reliability. High reliability is the science of achieving efficient, error-free
operation (Studer, 2008).
High Reliability Organization (HRO). An HRO has a foundation of six
principles that use predictable and repeatable systems that allow for the consistent
execution of operations while catching and correcting potentially catastrophic errors
(Casler, 2014).
Hospital. Hospitals are places where patients can receive emergency medicine,
primary care, surgery, internal medicine, and a variety of other medical services from
nurses, physicians, and other healthcare professionals (Gartmeier et al., 2017).
Joint Commission. The Joint Commission is a U.S.-based nonprofit organization
that accredits healthcare organizations and programs.
Leadership barriers. Leadership barriers are the objects, obstacles, and
challenges that inhibit a leader’s ability to lead (The Arbinger Institute, 2016).
Leadership engagement. Leadership engagement is a leader’s ability to be
aware of the organization while being cognizant of the interactions among the staff.
Leadership key concepts. Leadership key concepts are the principle concepts
used by leaders that have been deemed instrumental for success.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). The PPACA is a
healthcare initiative that made healthcare more affordable for people and increased the
coverage of care (Mittler et al., 2013).
Preoccupation with failure. Preoccupation with failure is the importance of
learning from failures and adjusting so as to prevent them from happening in the future.
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Reluctance to simplify. The reluctance to simplify is the challenging of
worldviews rather than acting on them to enact mindfulness of staff.
Sensitivity to operations. Sensitivity to operations is the empowerment of staff
to share the organizational responsibility to find hidden threats, resolve them, and report
any incidents or near misses.
Strong safety culture. A strong safety culture is making safety the top priority to
prevent errors and respond swiftly and effectively when an error occurs (Bonser, n.d.).
Value-based pilots. Value-based pilots are strategies for value in development
rewards quality, safety, experience, and outcomes rather than volume and intensity
(Khan, 2018; Smith et al., 2017).
Delimitations
This study was delimited to 44 military hospitals in the United States. This study
was further delimited to three military hospitals that implemented HROs. Though other
military hospitals may have implemented HRO practices, this study was limited to the
three military hospitals in the Puget Sound military medical market. The study
participants were narrowed to executive leaders who worked at any of the three military
hospitals during the implementation of an HRO.
Organization of the Study
The study comprises five chapters and includes references used in the
development of the study. Chapter I contained the introduction, background, research
statement, purpose statement, research questions, significance of the problem, definitions,
and delimitations. Chapter II contains the current literature and any pertinent literature
related to the research questions. Chapter III contains the methodology used for
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gathering the data, the sampling frame and sample used in the data, instrumentation, pilot
research, limitations, and data analysis. Chapter IV contains the results and analysis of
the gathered data. Finally, Chapter V contains a summary and a discussion of the key
findings, conclusions, implications, and final remarks, and the study ends with references
and appendices.
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This chapter discusses the relevant research in the fields of healthcare, military
healthcare, organizational change, and high reliability in order to build a foundation for
this study. The reasons why organizations such as hospitals employ change endeavors
such as high reliability are to improve their organizational effectiveness and prevent
errors. Kotter’s (2012) change management model is reviewed as the conditions that lead
major change initiatives. Additionally, the role that leadership engagement plays in
change initiatives is also explored.
Major changes are occurring in the healthcare industry. The Puget Sound military
medical market is also undergoing some major changes. This chapter examines a number
of healthcare initiatives implemented, strategies employed by leaders to make them
effective, and the challenges faced when implementing and maintaining them. Change
drivers are discussed in detail as is the leaderships’ role in healthcare. A synthesis matrix
is presented at the end of this chapter to assist in the organization of the literature.
This chapter explores the empirical research and literature related to leadership
engagement, behaviors, practices, and strategies employed by military hospital leaders in
the implementation of the high reliability healthcare change initiative. The focus of
errors and mistakes happening in healthcare are highlighted as well as outlined in many
aspects of Chapter II. Also discussed are the leadership key concepts used in support of a
High Reliability Organization (HRO) and its tools implementation of the high reliability
change initiative and its impact in managing organizational change initiatives. This
section also covers all eight stages of Kotter’s (2012) change model as it relates to
leadership engagement and high reliability.
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Complexities in Healthcare
Given the number of errors happening in healthcare daily, healthcare
professionals need to have the ability to formulate an assessment of the errors happening
and provide valuable feedback (Klevens et al., 2007). The practice of providing valuable
feedback in any organization can lead to more effective communication and the
prevention of potential errors in the future. Healthcare professionals are encouraged to
exude these kinds of behaviors to lead hospitals to becoming a zero error organization
(Tulis et al., 2016). However, there is a lack of data in the United States to suggest any
changes have been made as a result of this practice (Klevens et al., 2007). As a result, a
deeper examination on what will lead hospitals to becoming a zero error organizations is
needed.
Healthcare remains by far one of the most expensive industries in the world.
Millions of Americans remain uninsured or underinsured, costs of insurance and care are
increasingly unaffordable for much of the population, and outcomes of care are far worse
than they should be (Geyman, 2018). It can be naturally assumed that the cost of
healthcare is expensive as a result of doctor salaries, the risk of error associated with care
being provided, and the increased demand for care. However, the largely privatized
healthcare market is deteriorating in terms of increasing costs, decreasing access,
unacceptable quality of care, inequities, and disparities (Geyman, 2018). A combination
of these things has led the healthcare industry to where it is today.
Throughout many organizations, the need for better delivery of services,
operational efficiencies, and improved outcomes is there. HROs help ensure a positive
financial margin and long-term sustainability through competitive positioning and
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differentiation (Kristin, Bita, & Larry, 2015; Schuller et al., 2013). HROs are instituted
for reinforcing policies and procedures to ensure an organization is as error free as
possible. HROs are defined as “organizations that require nearly error-free operations all
the time because otherwise they are capable of experiencing catastrophes” (Milosevic et
al., 2018, p. 1175).
The process of transforming an organization into an HRO takes time for leaders to
initiate, implement, and maintain. According to Kristin et al. (2015), high reliability is an
evidence-based leadership initiative that requires leadership to engage with creating an
organizational structure for leaders, managers, and clinical staff to follow, which in turn
improves organizational focus, communication, and goal alignment (see Figure 1).
Quality, safety, and outcomes are big motivators for organizations wanting to
adopt high reliability. The reason these things are big motivators is that if errors or
mistakes were to happen, they could be catastrophic. When quality, safety, and outcomes
are emphasized, organizations are able to provide better services, prevent the harm of
people, and ensure that their organizations’ mission, vison, or goals are met.
High Reliability Organizations
Common trends in HROs are that they principally focus on preventing errors;
building resiliency, quality, or safety improvements; physician relations; patient
satisfaction; and culture (Spaulding et al., 2010). HROs follow a set of principles that act
as cultural characteristics. There are six high reliability principles, which are
preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, sensitivity to operations, deference
to expertise, reluctance to simplify, and strong safety culture.
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Figure 1. Enabling factor counts across the three stages. From “Studer Group®’s Evidence-Based
Leadership Initiatives: Comparing Success and Sustainability in Two Health Systems,” by A. S.
Kristin, A. K. Bita, & D. G. Larry, 2015, Journal of Health Organization and Management,
29(6), p. 694 (https://doi.org/10.1108/JHOM-10-2013-0211).

High Reliability Principle: Preoccupation With Failure
Preoccupation with failure is about the importance of learning from failures and
adjusting to prevent them from happening in the future. Staff in organizations understand
that mistakes emerge regularly from situations that are out of peoples’ control, so all staff
proactively think about what could go wrong and stay ready to take action on the signs of
potential problems (Patient Safety Network [PSNet], n.d.). An example of preoccupation
with failure is how NASA looks for technology errors consistently in its immature
technology (Casler, 2014). Ford (2018) explained, “Accordingly, HRO research tends to
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focus on the way failure offers abstracted insights as teachable moments for
organizational scholars and practitioners” (p. 197).
High Reliability Principle: Commitment to Resilience
The principle commitment to resilience focuses on an organization’s ability to
bounce back from making errors and mistakes. Staff are trained in HROs to manage high
levels of stress and maintain situational awareness to keep focused on the bigger picture
of the organization (Bonser, n.d.). The concept of resiliency acknowledges a reactionary
mindset in organizations that are coping with postfalures (Ford, 2018). Knowing that
failures have happened in organizations such as nuclear power plants, the commitment to
resilience in HROs expands past failures, allowing organizations to demonstrate that they
can identify potential threats from repeating themselves again and mitigate the
seriousness of a failure from happening again (PSNet, n.d.).
High Reliability Principle: Sensitivity to Operations
Teamwork is the crux of sensitivity to operations. HROs disseminate decisionmaking so that it empowers team members to find hidden threats, resolve them, and
report any incidents or near misses (Bonser, n.d.). Sensitivity to operations places the
burden of responsibility on every staff member to monitor the changes happening in the
organization and to combat the inhibiting vulnerabilities that come from changes (Ford,
2018). Sensitivity to operations is like having a shared mental model among staff of the
current state of the organization, which identifies all threats to the safety of the
organization (PSNet, n.d.).
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High Reliability Principle: Deference to Expertise
The principle of deference to expertise focuses on leaders listening to and
responding to others’ insights, regardless of rank, position, or title (Bonser, n.d.). All
staff members in HROs bring value and may be the subject matter expert on a particular
thing. For example, in healthcare, HROs’ clinicians, patients, and family members’ input
should be taken into consideration in establishing care processes and strategies to
improve safety and quality (Melnyk, 2012).
Deference to expertise goes beyond referring to subject matter experts.
Accordingly, deference to expertise is both a communication action and workplace
practice that demands all staff in an organization to have conviction and humility (Ford,
2018). According to Ford (2018), “Conviction conditions workers to recognize the limits
of their knowledge, and humility enables them to seek out others with more contextspecific expertise” (p. 200).
High Reliability Principle: Reluctance to Simplify
Complexity over simplicity, questioning information rather than discounting it,
and challenging worldviews rather than acting on them force employees to enact
mindfulness, which is the result of staff reluctant to simplify (Ford, 2018). For example,
oil workers need to do routine checks on machinery, and without their recognizing the
effects of weather events on metal, the metal can seriously jeopardize their safety. The
thought about weather is not explicitly a part of the routine task at hand, yet it is still
necessary. Mindsets solely focused on expectations serve as dangerous frames of
reference that allow workers to disregard risks because they simply forget about the
bigger picture of things (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). According to Ford (2018),
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“Privileging complexity over simplicity, questioning information rather than discounting
it, and challenging worldviews rather than acting on them force employees to enact
mindfulness” (p. 200).
High Reliability Principle: Strong Safety Culture
The principle of strong safety culture sets safety as the top priority to prevent
errors and respond swiftly and effectively when an error occurs (Bonser, n.d.). One type
of safety culture commonly found in healthcare organizations is called a just culture
(Bonser, n.d.; Frankel et al., 2006). Just culture in organizations are staff who learn and
improve by freely identifying and examining their own weaknesses (Frankel et al., 2006).
A just culture aligns with diversity because HROs provoke working professional
diversity enhancements that are error detection and problem-solving sources. For
example, NASA’s diversity serves more to demonstrate demographic balance and
responsiveness (Casler, 2014).
Additional Analysis
Some articles reference HROs as having five and six principles, pillars, and/or
characteristics. This researcher believed that the difference lay in the cultural aspects of
the principles. The strong safety culture principles are disputable as being needed
because it should be implied that safety should come from high reliability. Evolutions of
the literature based on dated articles show that there should be five high rollability
principles as of 2019 (Chassin & Loeb, 2013; Ford, 2018; Oster & Deakins, 2018).
Application of High Reliability Organization in Industry
The application of HROs has been applied to a number of industries such as
aerospace, electric, nuclear, military, aviation, and healthcare. A great example of how
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an HRO is applied in the electric industry is an important approach to crisis prevention
and mitigation (Casler, 2014; Grabowski & Roberts, 2019). If the power were to go out
throughout the Puget Sound due to a snowstorm, it would mean millions of residents
could potentially be at risk of being without resources or heat, which could be
catastrophic. The electric companies need to have the ability to respond or bounce back
from untoward, surprising, or disruptive events (Grabowski & Roberts, 2019).
Another great example of the HRO’s application is in the industry of aerospace.
NASA had once nested HROs within its space programs to ensure that the proper checks
and balances were happening (Casler, 2014). This use of an HRO is fundamental
because it helps lead industry audits and prevent any past horrific events from happening
again, like when the Space Shuttle Columbia broke up reentering earth’s atmosphere
resulting in the death of seven astronauts (Casler, 2014; Roberts, 1990a). As a result,
industries really must research and work to implement HROs within them.
Although HROs have been applied in a number of industries, they have their
advantages and disadvantages. After NASA had applied an HRO for many years, it
discovered that the implementation and maintenance of an HRO was too costly (Casler,
2014). NASA also identified that implementing HRO practices in an organization as
large as NASA was not quite possible and limited the effectiveness of many processes
when trying to do so (Casler, 2014). For the aviation industry, the application of HROs
allowed the FAA to develop efficient air traffic control processes. These processes have
prevented any two aircraft from colliding in the skies since the 1980s (Roberts, 1990a).
Depending on how each industry applied HROs, literature has shown advantages and
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disadvantages with its application (Casler, 2014; Grabowski & Roberts, 2019; Roberts,
1990a).
History of Healthcare
Healthcare in the United States began in the beginning of the 1900s. At the turn
of the century, healthcare became organized through the growth and development of the
formation of the American Medical Association (AMA). The AMA (n.d.) was organized
by a group of physicians with the goals of scientific advancement, standards for medical
education, launching a program of medical ethics, and improved public health. During
this time, the president of the United States became interested in targeting the
improvement of the health of the working class and lower-income citizens.
Healthcare coverage became the political focus of the United States. Through the
early and mid-1900s, the country was stricken by war and economic depressions leaving
the vast majority of citizens without healthcare. These adversities led to early health
insurance bills and the expansions of healthcare insurers such as Blue Shield and Blue
Cross (Griffin, 2017). Combining the expansion of health insurance and the continued
advancements in medicine set out by the AMA, the healthcare industry grew immensely
and accounted for approximately 5% of the GDP (Griffin, 2017).
In the late 1900s and early 2000s, a number of significant changes came to
healthcare, which focused on preserving the right for people to have safe, private, and
affordable healthcare. President Bill Clinton signed the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act into law. This act established privacy standards for healthcare
guaranteeing that a person’s medical record would be available upon their request and
placed restrictions on how preexisting conditions were treated in group health plans for
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healthcare insurers (Griffin, 2017). Finally, President Clinton signed into law the
Balanced Budget Act in 1997. It resulted in the Children’s Health Insurance Program
and the expansion of Medicaid coverage for underinsured children up to age 19 in
families with incomes too high to qualify them for Medicaid (Griffin, 2017).
Throughout the years, healthcare coverage has transformed from being a simple
medical coverage to becoming a more all-inclusive total healthcare coverage. According
to Vizzuso (2015), an estimated 77 million people in the United States will retire by
2029, leaving the single largest population segment in history needing Medicare
coverage. Medicare accounts for approximately 15% of the federal budget in the United
States, which is leading to an increase in healthcare costs and decrease in reimbursement
rates provided other healthcare coverage is creating sustainability issues for the health
industry as a whole (Vizzuso, 2015).
Cost of Healthcare
In part, because of the healthcare industry’s role in the GDP, the cost of
healthcare has risen. During the past several decades, health insurance premium
increases have exceeded inflation and surpassed the economic growth of wages,
therefore, forcing people to spend unsurmountable amounts of their income simply to
maintain their own health (Yong, Saunders, & Olsen, 2010). The rise in healthcare cost
is also because of the errors that are happening daily in the healthcare industry. Today’s
healthcare insurers, hospitals, and private practices want to make sure they have the extra
coverage from liability in case there is an error they caused.
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Services Provided to Patients
Since the beginning of healthcare, primum non nocere, or “first, do no harm,” has
been the central concept in healthcare, yet errors are made everyday harming patients
(Christianson, Sutcliffe, Miller, & Iwashyna, 2011). Many hospitals have a mission or
vison that focuses on putting their patients first. By putting patients first, some
researchers say that healthcare providers are more error prone.
Collaboration of Care to Improve Quality of Care
Healthcare has become robust, given the number of medical practices, medical
centers, and hospitals available to patients. Collaborative care is the collaboration of
healthcare professionals across specialties and the patients to achieve desired healthcare
outcomes. The process was developed as a preventative healthcare measure to get
patients more involved with their health. It also helps to keep all healthcare professionals
on the same page.
Staffing and Equipment Required
The staffing and equipment requirements for a private practice are far less than
what are required for a hospital. Hospital staffing consists of a number of healthcare
professionals such as physicians, nurses, technologists, administrators, and so forth.
Every healthcare professional plays an important role in the overall operations of a
hospital and a critical role in helping to prevent errors from happening daily. Hospitals
are complex organizations that require a number of staff and equipment.
Patient Populations
Patient populations are set to double within the next 30 years given the current
spending of government federal programs (Yong et al., 2010). Hospitals must take into
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consideration their patient populations so that they have the adequate resources to provide
quality care. For example, a geriatric patient might not want a pediatric physician
providing advanced care on them when that physician’s specialty training is solely
focused on children. Additionally, the aging of populations contributes to the rise of
healthcare resources needed. Healthcare cost grows, which drives the long-term need for
policies and affordable care.
Healthcare Policies and Laws
Policies in healthcare have been developed to help prevent errors and mistakes
from happening. They also can be limiting factors for providing care. Yet, because of
major medical errors and catastrophic mistakes made in the healthcare industry, Congress
has written into law the forward progression of healthcare for all people in the United
States. Two most notable laws are the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA) and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The PPACA, also referred to as the Affordable Care Act healthcare reform, or
Obamacare, was signed into law on March 23, 2010, by President Barack Obama (Gray
& Sullivan, 2011). The PPACA set new rules and policies for how the healthcare
industry offered, administrated, and accepted healthcare coverage. This law directly
regulates healthcare providers, insurance companies, individuals, and employers. The
PPACA was developed with the intention of making healthcare affordable for all people
and preventing healthcare providers and insurance companies from taking advantage of
people. According to Gray and Sullivan (2011), the PPACA was driven by the concerns
that Congress had about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable
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economic growth in spending on healthcare and health insurance. Since the inception of
the PPACA, there have been many revisions to this law addressing the access to care for
patients and the cost to care for them.
National Defense Authorization Act
President Donald Trump signed into law the John S. McCain NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2019 on August 13, 2018 (Fetzer, Martinez, & Stott, 2018). The NDAA authorized
a $717 billion national defense budget affecting numerous aspects of the U.S. military,
including certain reforms to the government’s acquisition policy and military health
systems (Fetzer et al., 2018). The purpose of the NDAA is to specify annual budgets and
expenditures for the Department of Defense so that it continues to push forward with its
growth, technologies, and advancements.
The Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA has a number of articles that cover military
healthcare. The NDAA pushes military healthcare into a more centralized system. The
military health system will be expected to be less reliant on the individual branch’s
specific ways of delivering healthcare that the Army, Navy, and Air Force currently
operate. The current Army, Navy, and Air Force’s health commands will move most of
their responsibilities to the Defense Health Agency (DHA; Serbu, 2018). The NDAA
also gives the DHA director more authority over the operation of military treatment
facilities and orders the agency to reorganize those hospitals and clinics into a new
regional management structure (Serbu, 2018). According to Serbu (2018), “The NDAA
repeats an earlier edict that the Defense Health Agency take over the administration of
the more than 400 Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) currently run by the Army,
Navy, and Air Force” (para. 7). Although any change was hard to make happen

33

overnight, the NDAA had set a 3-year phased implementation plan that has the DHA
fully taking over military healthcare by September 30, 2020.
Civilian Healthcare
For most patients, healthcare is something that needs to be readily accessible and
available for when an accident happens or illness presents itself (Ensuring Patients’
Access to Care and Privacy, 2015). The accessibility to healthcare can come in a number
of forms such as private practice, primary care, urgent care, or specialty care. Regardless
of the type or complexity of care, civilian healthcare is supposed to be available for all
people as outlined in a number of governmental policies (Fetzer et al., 2018; Gray &
Sullivan, 2011). This differs significantly from military healthcare because the military
can limit the care it provides and to whom it provides care.
Military Healthcare
Military doctrine supports modern healthcare services by creating its own mobile
healthcare system that can triage, treat, evacuate, and return patients to duty in the most
time-efficient manner anywhere in the world (Borden Institute, 2013). The military
healthcare system is broken down into four levels of care. Each level of medical care
may vary depending on the branch of service. For example, the Army has what are called
forward surgical teams whereas the Air Force has mobile field surgical teams. In this
section, the levels of military care are outlined.
Military First Level of Care (Role 1)
The first level of medical care starts at the point of injury of a patient. This level
of medical care is often provided to patients in the field by themselves, a buddy, or a
combat lifesaver (nonmedical team/squad member trained in enhanced first aid; Borden
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Institute, 2013). The first level of care can also be provided by medical providers in
small aid stations with limited medical advances (Borden Institute, 2013). Additionally,
there are various levels of training for which individuals who are providing aid in the first
level of medical care can have, which include the special forces medical sergeant, special
operations combat medic, SEAL independent duty corpsman, special boat corpsman,
pararescue man, and special operations medical technician (Borden Institute, 2013). The
various levels of medical training and point of origin of care create risk and are often
viewed as the most critical care with significant risk for error.
Military Second Level of Care (Role 2)
The second level of medical care in the Army consists of a wider range of medical
support services often called forward surgical teams whereas the Air Force calls them
mobile field surgical teams (Borden Institute, 2013). This level of medical care offers
patients basic primary care and, depending on the medical capabilities, optometry,
behavioral health, dental, laboratory, radiology, and/or limited surgical capabilities.
According to the Borden Institute (2013), the staffing required for the second level of
medical care can range from advanced medical supports services to fleet surgical teams.
Military Third Level of Care (Role 3)
The third level of medical care in the military represents the highest level of
medical care available within the combat zone. This level of care consists of most
deployable hospitals, which are oftentimes modular, allowing medical care to be tailored
to the medical response needs or actual demand (Borden Institute, 2013). The Army and
Air Force have combat support hospitals that provide a full range of medical services
from routine checkup to potentially full trauma support and can provide inpatient hospital
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services ranging in bed capacities of 25 to 248 beds (Borden Institute, 2013).
Additionally, the Navy has two hospital ships, the USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort, that
provide the same deployable hospital support throughout the world in support of military
operations. The two hospital ships have inpatient bed capacities that can support 1,000
beds (Borden Institute, 2013).
Military Fourth Level of Care (Role 4)
The fourth level of medical care in the military provides prolific medical and
surgical care outside of combat zones. Care is often provided in communication and
collaboration with deployed operational teams around the world. This level of care
supports patients requiring more intensive rehabilitation or special needs (Borden
Institute, 2013). Traditionally, facilities at this level of care are referred to as field
hospitals and general hospitals (Borden Institute, 2013). Examples of general hospitals
are the fixed hospital Landstuhl Army Regional Medical Center in Germany and
Madigan Army Medical Center in the United Sates.
Major Change in Military Healthcare
Healthcare in the military is transforming and modernizing so that it is more
competitive and comparable to its community partners. DHA is taking over all military
medicine so that it is able to better manage the complexities, which lay in the varying
levels of military medicine and throughout the number of military hospitals in the world.
DHA is gaining traction with developing policies, which apply to all military treatment
facilities (MTFs). One policy in particular that stands out is its Interim Procedures
Memorandum, which helps to standardize care throughout all MTFs. Learning from best
practices makes the creation of new policies more digestible and applicable.
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The 2019 NDAA that became law on August 13, 2018, mandated a number of
changes and improvements that must happen in military healthcare. The NDAA is a
Congress-led law that outlines a number of initiatives, changes, and developments to the
U.S. national defense, which include subordinate organizations of each branch of the
military. In the 2019 NDAA, Congress highlighted the major change that DHA would
take over all military health systems by September 30, 2020. The transition of DHA’s
take over is not supposed to result in the closure or downsizing of MTFs. It has,
however, eliminated administrative overhead and layers of management in the military
health system (Serbu, 2018). Overall, DHA’s takeover is supposed to improve the
readiness of military health systems, their programs, and the overall healthcare provided
to the patrons they serve.
Military health systems are service-based healthcare systems geared to provide
medical care for service members and their families. Most of the time, military health
systems are divided into different regional commands that support military healthcare
markets such as the Regional Health Command–Pacific or Regional Health Command–
Atlantic. The Regional Health Command–Pacific supports the Puget Sound Military
Healthcare Market. All of the hospitals in the military health systems are interconnected
and networked with their community partners through their perspective military
healthcare markets.
High Reliability Hospitals
Every HRO has its own foundation based on its organizational mission, vison, and
values (Oster et al., 2016). An HRO builds on its foundation by using a number of tools
to get the organization to prevent errors and mistakes but also become as close as it can to
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being error free. A highly reliable hospital uses a number of resources and tools that are
available to it to implement and maintain being an HRO (Ackerman et al., 2019; Oster &
Deakins, 2018).
Training Involved
Training being only a small portion of high reliability in hospitals is crucial to
harboring the foundation of HROs (Cawsey, Deszca, & Ingols, 2012). Hospitals may not
be able to necessarily close down to conduct training, but they do a great job at offering it
regularly to all staff. Hospitals often have training plans laid out for each year. Some
hospitals may even have internal hospital trainers whom they tap into. Additionally,
hospitals have the added benefit that most healthcare professionals have requirements to
earn a number of continual education credits each year (Hunt, 2006).
Mitigating Risk
The mitigation of risk is very important to high reliability hospitals given the fact
that patients could die as a result of errors or mistakes happening (Quigley & White,
2013). When mistakes happen to patients in high reliability hospitals, there is
organizational concern toward the possibility of legal actions. High reliability hospitals
want to mitigate all the risks that they can and create preventable processes that do not
lead them to being susceptible to risk (Quigley & White, 2013). In most hospitals, there
are a number of risk management options to choose how to improve things. Some of
these risk management options are process improvement teams, quality services sections,
or medical review committees (Oster et al., 2016).
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Preventative Measures
High reliability hospitals have internal processes that prevent errors from
happening (Quigley & White, 2013). More often than not, electronic preventative
measures are easy to recognize (Emmert et al., 2016). There are preventative measures
such as electronic health records (EHRs), safety time-outs, and stop-before-you-proceed
alert messages that pop-up on computers. Electronics and medical devices provide a
level of checks and balances for high reliability hospitals (Khan, 2018).
High Reliability in Civilian Hospitals
High reliability in civilian hospitals is something that has been happening for
many decades. An HRO has been something that is believed to have set apart the best of
hospitals from those that are not by their ability to seek collaboration among all
healthcare clinicians and improvement of overall healthcare outcomes (Joint
Commission, n.d.). With the intention of providing the best possible healthcare and
living the Hippocratic oath of doing no harm to others, civilian hospitals have been able
to adapt new skill sets required for executive leaders to function effectively and align
themselves as organizational entities with their patient communities as they grow and
change over the years (Slayton-Robinson, 2017).
With a large number of civilian hospitals being nonprofit organizations, clinical
improvement has been at the forefront of system-wide integration, and executive leaders
focus on cultivating organizations that have a culture that displays civility and humility
(Slayton-Robinson, 2017). Such organizational culture has been recognized by the Joint
Commission and part of the reason many hospitals build alliances with one another
(Gerald, 2011). The alliance of civilian hospitals can be dependent on Joint Commission

39

accreditation. The Joint Commission has a number of governing affiliates such as The
American College of Physicians (ACP), The American Dental Association (ADA), The
American Hospital Association (AHA), and The American Medical Association (AMA;
Hospital Accreditation, 2006; Slayton-Robinson, 2017). Civilian hospital affiliation with
other HRO hospitals can allow hospitals to specialize in handling a narrower range of
cases, which in turn can lead to the best of patient outcomes and cost efficiency (Gerald,
2011). HRO practices in civilian hospitals and military hospitals may be similar in many
ways but differ given the military’s mission. Ultimately, through hospital alliances,
civilian hospitals learn from other HRO hospitals, much like military hospitals (Gerald,
2011).
High Reliability in Military Hospitals
High reliability in military hospitals is a relatively new thing that came about
within the past decade and a push by the Joint Commission for all of its hospitals to
become HROs (Matiella, 2011). High reliability in military hospitals is a highly complex
thing given the Department of Defense’s mission to deter war and to protect the security
of this country. With the implementation of high reliability in military hospitals, there
are impacts, outcomes, and tools that need to be taken into account for it to be maintained
(Matiella, 2011).
Impact on Military Mission
Military hospitals are motivated to drive the operational missions of fighting and
defending the United States from foreign and domestic enemies. The Borden Institute
(2013) stated that “the system begins with the casualty on the battlefield and ends in
hospitals located within the continental United States (CONUS) and other safe havens”
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(p. 19). Compliance with HROs in the battlefield is unlikely, given other international
policies come to light, and with the rapid succession of deploying troops to the
battlefield, medical staff can forget about the compliance with HROs when they come
back to working in a military hospital. The reason is that in the battlefield, medical staff
is expected to fight off the enemy first before rendering care to patients (Borden Institute,
2013).
Healthcare Outcomes
Clinical outcomes are very important when it comes to making a difference in the
healthcare industry. A great example of how clinical outcomes have improved the
healthcare industry is that they support the development and revision of evidence-based
practices. The Army, Navy, and Air Force use a behavioral health system called the
Behavioral Health Data Portal. The Behavioral Health Data Portal gathers data from both
patients and providers on treatment that is being provided. In the end, the data are used
yearly to update current evidence-based practices, to promote research of clinicians in
medicine, and to evolve clinical guidelines. Military hospitals are mandated to providing
nothing but evidence-based practices and comply with the Department of
Defense/Veteran Affairs Clinical guidelines (Serbu, 2018).
Tools for High Reliability
There are a number of HRO tools used to implement high reliability in military
hospitals. Such tools used are Acknowledge, Introduce, Duration, Explanation, and
Thank You (AIDET); discharge phone calls (DPC); high medium low; hourly rounding
on patients; leaders evaluation manager; leadership development institute; monthly
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meeting model; reward and recognition; rounding on employees; and rounding on
internal customers (Table 1).
Table 1
Military Hospital HRO Tools
Tool

Description

AIDET

Communication checklist that all hospital employees
utilize when interacting with a patient: acknowledge,
introduce, duration, explanation, thank you

Discharge phone calls (DPC)

Post-discharge follow-up mechanism that allows nurses
to inquire about the medication adherence, issues with
pain, and follow-up appointments

High medium low

A simplified human resource rubric that calls for
managers to rate their staff and identify areas for
improvement. Multiple offense low performers are
terminated.

Hourly rounding® on patients

Nurses check-in on their patients on an hourly basis
during awake hours to check on comfort levels

Leaders evaluation manager

Automated performance evaluation application for
midlevel managers

Leadership development institute
(LDI)

A quarterly meeting hosted at an offsite location that is
attended by all managers, directors, VPs, and C-suite to
share best practices, report on outcomes, and meet peers

Monthly meeting model

Monthly reporting template for all who report to vice
presidents or higher

Reward and recognition

Hand-written notes from managers sent to employee’s
homes to compliment and thank them for their work

Rounding on employees

Managers check-in regularly on their staff to identify
positive outcomes or problem areas that should be
addressed or escalated

Rounding on internal customers

Interdepartmental evaluation of services and needs

Note. AIDET and hourly rounding are registered trademarks owned by Studer Group ®. Adapted
from “Studer Unplugged: Identifying Underlying Managerial Concepts,” by A. C. Spaulding, L.
D. Gamm, and J. M. Griffith, 2010, Hospital Topics, 88(1), 1–9
(https://doi.org/10.1080/00185860903534125); “Enabling and Disabling Factors in
Implementation of Studer Group’s Evidence-Based Leadership Initiative: A Qualitative Case
Study,” by K. A. Schuller, B. A. Kash, N. Edwardson, and L. D. Gamm, 2013, Journal of
Communication in Healthcare, 6(2), 90–99 (https://doi.org/10.1179/1753807613Y.0000000033).
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Tools for high reliability hospitals are meant to support the quality, safety, and
outcomes by acting as guides or internal checks and balances (Kristin et al., 2015). HRO
tools are resources that hospital leaders are able to tap into to maintain HRO compliance
in their hospitals. HRO tools also have a cause and effect in hospital leadership forcing
leaders to engage more with their staff (Spaulding et al., 2010).
Hospital Leadership
Hospital Leadership, whether it is made up of C-suite executives or ranking
military leaders, is foundational for the overall success of a hospital. Hospital leaders
have the ability to impact all staff members through their interactions with one another
and patients (Hornstrup, 2015). Executive leaders must have the ability to chair
committees or develop teams who make decisions that affect everyone within the
organization, potentially impacting healthcare outcomes as well (Roter, 2011).
Leadership Engagement
Leadership engagement is a vital part of any hospital’s leadership. It is the act of
leaders engaging with staff (Croxton, 2011; Vaughn et al., 2006; Vizzuso, 2015).
Leadership engagement is very much about communication (Croxton, 2011; Vaughn et
al., 2006; Vizzuso, 2015). Communication in hospitals happens in many different modes,
forms, and mediums. Leaders communicate with staff during daily, weekly, and monthly
staff meetings. They also communicate through emails and phone calls, electronic
medical records, and other instant communication devices. Almost all of the modes,
forms, and mediums that communication leaders use are means for informing staff of
what is happening in the hospital.
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Leadership engagement is a two-way stream between leaders and staff: “The
power of example is a hugely potent social force” (Friedman & Mandelbaum, 2011,
p. 26). Leaders and staff need to be able to communicate vertically and horizontally so
that information gets to everyone. This aspect of communication helps reach a broader
audience because staff can relay the information received to those who were not present
for the meetings (Spaulding et al., 2010).
Executive Teams
Executive leadership teams are formed to look at the bigger picture of the medical
mission in hospitals (Groves, 2019). Executive teams in most hospitals consist of a chief
executive officer, chief medical officer, chief nursing officer, chief operating officer,
chief financial officer, chief administrative officer, and more. Executive teams in
military hospitals consist of equivalent senior ranking military leaders of similar
disciplines. Each executive team focuses on a specific area of the overall mission in a
hospital (Roter, 2011).
Military Hospital Leadership
Military hospital leaders serve more than just their staff in the hospital. Military
hospital leaders must also serve the major commands for which they support. For
example, a military hospital commander must answer not only to a general officer over
their military health system but also to the general officers over the Corps that their MTF
supports.
Leadership Structure
Hospital leadership structures tend to mirror a traditional board of C-suite
executives with a few additional C-suite positions that are not found in organizations
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other than hospitals (Figure 2). The leadership structure in hospitals can be complicated
because no one person has the authority or power to override someone who raises a red
flag or safety concern. Everyone in the leadership structure of a hospital has his or her
own area of influence and specific specialty of expertise.

Figure 2. Civilian hospital organizational model.

Leadership structures in military hospitals are different because of many reasons.
Military hospital leadership changes completely every 3 to 5 years. There is the added
possessive power that comes with the rank in the military that makes the leadership
structure different. Typically, only senior military officers hold the executive leader
positions in military hospitals, meaning that they are of the rank of colonel or captain, are
of the pay grade of 0–6, and have held commander leadership positions up to executive
leader positions in a military hospital (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Military hospital organizational model. From “Moving From a Medical Anachronism:
A New Approach to Military Medical Treatment Facility Organization in the National Capital
Area,” by C. W. Callahan, 2013, U.S. Army Medical Department Journal, p. 62.

Executive leader positions in military hospitals do not have the same names as
traditional hospitals do. For example, the most senior position in a military hospital is the
commander, which is equivalent to a CEO in a traditional hospital. Regardless of
position names in military or civilian hospitals, leadership structure is what sets up the
stages for long-term sustainable change in all hospitals.
Hospital leaders must have a process for implementing change. Kotter’s (2012)
eight-stage change model can help guide hospital leaders to implement change and
potentially improve their success rates with change (Baloh, Zhu, & Ward, 2018).
However, Kotter’s (2012) change model is understudied in many different fields; the
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field particularly related to this study is healthcare. Literature related to Kotter’s change
model in healthcare reported in studies that it was successful, and the Kotter model was
viewed as a useful implementation guide for leaders (Baloh et al., 2018; Figure 4).

Foundation for Change

Process of Change

Outcome of Change

High Reliability
Organization Principles

Kotter’s Eight-Stages
to Change

Implemented High
Reliability Organization

Oster, C. A., Sigma Theta Tau, I., & Braaten, J.
(2016). High Reliability Organizations: A
healthcare handbook for patient safety &
quality. Indianapolis, IN: Sigma Theta Tau
International

Preoccupation
with failure

Kotter, J. P. (2012). Leading change: Boston:
Harvard Business Review Press

Establishing a sense of
urgency
Creating the guiding
coalition

Commitment to
resilience

Developing a vision
strategy

Sensitivity to
operations

Communicating the
change vision

Deference to
expertise
Reluctance to
simplify
Strong safety
culture

Empowering employees
for broad-based action

Exceptionally
Safe,
Consistently
High Quality
Care

Gathering short term wins
Consolidating gains and
producing more change
Anchoring new
approaches in the culture

Figure 4. Kotter’s change model in healthcare. Adapted from “Implementing team huddles in
small rural hospitals: How does the Kotter model of change apply?”, by J. Baloh, X. Zhu, & M.
M. Ward, 2018, Journal of Nursing Management, 26(5), p.15
(https://doi.org/10.1111/jonm.12584).

The process of change in implementing HROs is something that leaders need to
look at closely. Kotter’s (2012) eight-stage change model should be examined because it
aligns with HROs by being a change process that highlights the values of culture, vision,
and expertise of staff (Veazie, Gilbert, Winchell, Paynter, & Guise, 2019), all of which
are part of the desired outcomes of implemented HROs (Chassin & Loeb, 2013).
Moreover, executive leaders need to think of how the change process took the initiative
of HROs from being the foundation for change to being implemented and maintain
outcomes.

47

Kotter’s Eight-Stage Change Theory
Kotter (2012) developed an eight-stage change model that gave leaders a roadmap
for leading organizations through transformation and change initiatives (Figure 5).
Kotter came up with these eight stages when he discovered that most organizations make
the same eight errors during change initiatives. Kotter’s eight-stage change model sets
leaders up to promote continual changes instead of single-track changes. Kotter
ultimately decided not to address the eight errors that lead to serious consequences and
instead focused on finding ways for leaders to implement change correctly, initiate timely
and costly change projects, and cause the change initiatives to produce desired results.

Figure 5. Kotter’s 8-step model. From Leading Change, by J. P. Kotter, 2012, p. 22, Boston, MA:
Harvard Business Review Press.

Establishing a Sense of Urgency
According to Kotter (2012), establishing a sense of urgency is primary for leaders
to gain cooperation with staff during change initiatives. Staff will not change unless they
can see the need to change (Appelbaum, Habashy, Malo, & Shafiq, 2012). The need for

48

change must be understood by staff so that change agents have enough power and
credibility to initiate a particular change initiative (Appelbaum et al., 2012). A sense of
urgency is the first step in showing the attractiveness of the change, confronting
employees with clear expectations, showing that it can be done, and creating a positive
attitude for change (Appelbaum et al., 2012).
Creating the Guiding Coalition
The second stage of an adequately guiding coalition supports the first step of
establishing a sense of urgency by finding a common need for change among staff.
According to Kotter (2012), leaders cannot single-handedly lead or manage a change
initiative in an organization without putting together the right guiding coalition of staff to
lead a change initiative toward success. A guiding coalition will consist of staff who
have four characteristics: positional power, expertise, credibility, and leadership.
Kotter’s change-leading coalition requires staff with all four characteristics so that
change initiatives aren’t blocked. Additionally, Kotter advocated for coalitions to assist
with the change process because change will be without frontline staff engaging in
adaptive behaviors.
Developing a Vision Strategy
According to Kotter (2012), guiding a coalition later begins with the task of
formulating a clear and sensible vision for the transformation effort of change to start.
Without a clear and sensible vision, change objectives can easily dissolve, and the change
initiatives can become confusing and incompatible, which may take the organization in
the wrong direction (Appelbaum et al., 2012). In order to break the status quo and look
beyond the immediate need for change, an effective vision of where the organization is
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headed can make it easier for staff to understand the change and take action (Appelbaum
et al., 2012). Therefore, developing a vision strategy can appeal to staff and make the
long-term interest of change desirable to everyone who has a stake in the organizational
change initiative.
Communicating the Change Vision
Communication is a critical element in any organizational change process.
Communication can help to reduce uncertainty, decrease ambiguity, and create an
atmosphere where staff feel they can react positively or negatively in response to change
initiatives (Appelbaum et al., 2012). Staff who react to change and communicate their
reactions using two-way communication are always more powerful (Appelbaum et al.,
2012). Kotter (2012) suggested that leaders must ensure that change messages
communicate the vision repeatedly so that the change messages sink deeply into staff
member’s minds after they have heard it many times. Simple techniques such as
engaging in storytelling and symbolic action can be used to make connection of the
change and the vision with staff. However, there are many forms to communication that
leaders can use to relay the need for change initiatives and the future state of the
organization (Appelbaum et al., 2012).
Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action
According to Kotter (2012), staff in organizations that embrace trying new ideas
and approaches often gain empowerment from their leaders simply by the successful
communication of their vision about the organization. Yet the communication of the
organizational vision is not enough. Leaders need to also help staff get rid of barriers and
obstacles to change the staff’s visions into action. Kotter explained, “Typically,
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empowering employees involves addressing four major obstacles: structures, skills,
systems, and supervisors” (p. 102). Through the use of addressing the stressors related to
these four major obstacles of empowering staff, the empowerment process begins, and
actions are taken. Giving staff even the smallest empowering opportunities can have a
profound effect on behaviors and actions. It can also provide staff buy-in and control
over change processes that help keep moving change forward.
Generating Short-Term Wins
The sixth stage of generating short-term wins is about staff seeing the changes as
they are happening and recognizing their efforts toward achieving the overall change
goals set by the change vision. According to Kotter (2012), short-term wins demonstrate
that the change process is working, and the effort of change is paying off. Short-term
wins help leaders test their change vision against real conditions with their guiding
coalitions and make adjustments so they are more effective (Appelbaum et al., 2012).
Additionally, short-term wins are meant to provide leaders with the opportunities to
celebrate and reward their staff for adapting to change. (Kotter, 2012).
Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change
Kotter (2012) described consolidating gains and producing more change by
leaders continuing to push change by declaring victories after the first signs of
performance improvement are visible. However, the pushing of more change can cause
the regression of the original change vision. This is a crucial point in the eight-stage
change process for leaders who must leverage the use of these short-term gains to
overcome other issues, prevent regression, and secure a positive position with staff who
are not in line with the new changes that are being pushed to be implemented (Kotter,
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2012). Consolidating gains and producing more change need to be shown to staff that
this is a new way of working (Appelbaum et al., 2012). For leaders to show staff that
they must neutralize cynics and self-centered opponents, they should make sure victory is
not declared too soon, keep momentum of change going, and ensure that the urgency for
change is still alive with their guiding coalition (Appelbaum et al., 2012). Such actions
empower staff to lead and align with the change vision, which is necessary for the
production of additional change (Kotter, 2012).
Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture
The final stage of anchoring new approaches in the culture is about the belief that
new mindsets and behaviors of employees are formed through the change process. If the
new behaviors of employees are not rooted in social norms and shared values once the
pressure for change is alleviated, then they will revert back to the way that they were
before the change started (Appelbaum et al., 2012). Kotter (2012) stated that there are
two factors that are critical to the institutionalization of change in a culture. The first
factor is showing employees how the new mindsets, behaviors, and approaches have
helped improve the overall performance of the organization. The second factor is
ensuring that a future generation of leaders and managers personify the similar new
mindsets, behaviors, and approaches. All of the alterations that create changes help
organizations practice the firm belief that change visions are important, but only at the
end of a change cycle does most of this become anchored in the culture (Kotter, 2012).
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the fields of healthcare,
military healthcare, organizational change, and high reliability. High reliability is a
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change initiative that hospitals have implemented to improve their organizational
effectiveness and prevent errors. For hospitals to implement high reliability, it is
important for their leaders to learn how to successfully implement change in an
organization. Kotter’s (2012) eight-stage change management model was used to change
a number of organizations, and future research may further explain how HRO change
initiatives are made using a change management model like Kotter’s eight-stage change
model as a study framework.
A gap in the research exists in the fact that there is little research that has explored
military hospital leadership experiences in initiating and implementing HRO initiatives.
The perception of the healthcare industry is that all hospitals are continuing to improve
their quality and safety based on the errors and mistakes made. Implementing HROs is
one initiative that has been adopted as an industry standard based on the Joint
Commission accreditation, yet an HRO differs in its approach based on the literature.
For military hospitals to continue to improve, strong leadership is needed to
manage the change development of HRO initiatives in military hospitals. Leadership
resistance is met during the initiating and implementing phase of an HRO. Leadership
engagement is the starting place where hospital leaders can begin the processes of
implementing changes, such as those in HROs, and it is important to address this gap in
the research. Understanding leadership engagement in implementing changes will further
demonstrate the effects of executive leaders’ changes. Gaining the perspectives of those
leaders who implemented the change is crucial to the success of implementing HROs in
future military hospitals.

53

Synthesis Matrix
A synthesis matrix was used by this researcher to organize study variables
presented in the review of the literature. The synthesis matrix is a kind of conceptual
framework table that enabled this researcher to get a quick overview of data related to the
research variables. This matrix assisted the researcher to draw conclusions about
nonobvious relationships that exist between entries on the table. Matrices contain verbal
information, quotes, summarized text, extracts from notes, memos, standardized
responses, and in general, data integrated from a point or research theme that makes
sense. This study’s matrix shows data on the variables and cites the researcher or author.
The matrix contributed to the validity of the study variables.
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
Overview
The healthcare industry is continuously evolving and innovating because of
studies that healthcare professionals are doing, and this is something that needs to
continue. According to Schuller et al. (2013), over 800 healthcare organizations have
already participated in a Studer Groups HRO initiative, which provides coaches who help
establish a framework to align the goals, actions, and processes of the organization and
provide the foundation for transformation of healthcare delivery. This study explores and
examines how executive leaders of military hospitals implemented and maintained High
Reliability Organizations (HRO) initiatives. The study delves deep into the processes
that made HROs successful and the complex obstacles and barriers leaders in healthcare
face engaging employees implementing high reliability. This chapter describes the
methodology used for this study and includes the purpose statement, research questions,
research design, population, sample, instrumentation including its validity and reliability,
data collection, data analysis, and limitations.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and explain the
leadership strategies that military hospital executive leaders use to engage hospital staff
in implementation of the six principles of HROs.
Research Questions
1. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was preoccupied with
failure?
2. What strategies did executive leaders use to commit to resiliency?
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3. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was sensitive to
operations?
4. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was deference to
expertise?
5. What strategies did executive leaders use to be reluctant to accept simple explanations
for problems?
6. What strategies did executive leaders use to create a strong safety culture?
Research Design
The research design for this study was a qualitative case study. The aim of the
study was to explore strategies used by executive leaders who are needed to initiate and
manage the change development of HRO initiatives implemented. In the context of
change development, real-life experiences needed to be examined (Patton, 2015). Data
from interviews, documentation, and archival records were collected from the Puget
Sound Military Health System.
Qualitative Design
The use of qualitative methodology allowed this researcher to gather the type of
data most appropriate to the study’s purpose and research questions. Patten (2012)
stated, “In qualitative research, researchers gather data that must be analyzed through the
use of informed judgment to identify major and minor themes expressed by participants”
(p. 9). This research method allowed the researcher to gather viewpoints from a senior
military leader population about HRO initiatives and the effects of the change.
Qualitative research is one form of in-depth research that utilizes data collected in person
and through observations with individuals and material (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010).
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The qualitative data gained from research participants revealed themes and patterns that
enabled the researcher to answer the underlying questions of the case study. A military
leader’s insight of HRO initiatives may be able to shed valuable information for future
research of the subject.
Case Study Design
A case study allows the researcher to interview leaders who have implemented
and expect to sustain high reliability in their organizations. Creswell (2008) referred to
the case study as “an in-depth exploration of a bounded system based on extensive data
collection” (p. 344). HROs are supposed to be the solution to the complex issues of error
and inefficacies in healthcare organizations, and the researcher hoped that the extensive
experiences from these leaders could add strength or new information to what is already
known through previous research on the topic. According to Yin (2014), the case study
research method is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not
clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. The rationale for a
qualitative case study design is that the single case is unique and provided the researcher
with various approaches to define the case using data-rich information derived from
multiple sources (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010; Yin, 2014).
Population
According to McMillan and Schumacher (2010), a population is “a group of
individuals or events from which a sample is drawn and to which results can be
generalized” (p. 5). Given the qualitative nature of this research and because there was
only a single case investigated, the study aimed to produce analytical inferences rather
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than statistical generalizations to a larger population (Yin, 2014). According to
“Medicine and the Military” (n.d.), there are approximately 44 military hospitals in the
continental United States and three in the Puget Sound Military Health System. This
study targeted a sampling frame from the Puget Sound Military Health System, which
encompasses three military hospitals. Military hospitals and clinics are the core of a
military health system. Military health systems were created to improve the access to
care and to make an easier way of supplementing care that is needed in a particular
geographical are.
Sampling Frame
The sampling frame for a study is the entire set of individuals chosen from the
overall population for which the study data are to be used to make inferences (McMillan
& Schumacher, 2010). It is important that the sampling frame is clearly identified for the
purposes of research study (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). It is typically not feasible,
because of time or cost constraints, to study large groups; therefore, the researcher chose
population samples from within a larger group. The sampling frame was identified as
having unique characteristics of this case study based on its demographic characteristics
(McMillan & Schumacher, 2010) as being executive leaders who worked in military
hospitals during the implementation of HRO initiatives in the Puget Sound Military
Health System.
The Puget Sound Military Health System consists of three military hospitals and a
number of military clinics, which are located in Washington State but provide medical
services to patients throughout other states to include Oregon and California (DHA,
2016). The largest hospital in the Puget Sound Military Health System is Madigan Army
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Medical Center. According to Ilic-Godfrey and Lawhorn (2018), the military healthcare
workforce comprises 60% civilian staff compared to the 40% active-duty military staff.
Healthcare is provided to more than 288,500 beneficiaries, ensuring military members,
retirees, and families get timely access to the highest quality of healthcare (DHA, 2016).
To best study this population, the researcher had to be more specific about the
sample given that the Puget Sound Military Health System has approximately 240
executive leaders who make up the larger sampling frame. Not all of the Puget Sound
Military Health System’s executive leaders have direct experience with the
implementation of an HRO during the span of the past 10 years. The sampling frame was
further narrowed to approximately 60 executive leaders who met the study criteria of
direct experience with the implementation of an HRO.
The sampling frame for this study was limited to three hospitals in the Puget
Sound Military Health System, which has approximately 60 executive leaders all
together. By interviewing three executive leaders from any of the three Puget Sound
Military Health System hospitals, it was intended that the perceptions and experiences of
the executive leaders would provide insight into how an HRO was implemented. The
researcher hoped to gather feedback from all the different hospitals’ executive leaders or
at least all who have oversight of them.
Sample
A sample is defined as a small group derived from a general population from
which data are gathered (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The study used purposeful
sampling for the qualitative approach. According to McMillan and Schumacher (2010),
purposeful sampling is when the researcher “selects a sample that is representative of the
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population or that includes subjects with needed characteristics” (p. 138). For this study,
purposeful sampling was chosen as the method of sample selection based on the criteria
used for the executive leaders. This involved identification and selection of individuals
or groups of individuals who were proficient and well-informed with a phenomenon of
interest. In addition to knowledge and experience, the importance of availability and
willingness to participate are needed along with the ability to communicate experiences
and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner (McMillan &
Schumacher, 2010).
The sample for this study was limited to interviewing no more than three
executive leaders who worked in one of the three Puget Sound Military Health System
hospitals. To gather rich information, purposeful sampling was used. According to
Patten (2012), purposeful sampling is “when researchers purposively select individuals
who they believe will be good sources of information” (p. 51). The sample selected was
based on the leaders’ involvement with the HRO initiatives and implementation of the
HRO at their organizations. The sample comprised executive leaders who had more than
10 years of work experience in the military healthcare systems and who worked in one of
the three Puget Sound Military Health System hospitals. The sample comprised leaders
who held position titles equivalent to community hospital directors, chief executives, or
adjunct senior leaders while an HRO was implemented in their hospital. One executive
leader was selected from each of the three hospitals in the Puget Sound Military Health
System. The sample comprised diverse leaders who had different ethnicities, ages, and
economic backgrounds. This diversity included both military and civilians who worked
in military hospitals.
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Instrumentation
The researcher of this study developed a synthesis matrix of the literature that
supports the topics of high reliability and leadership engagement in military hospitals (see
Appendix A). Important research talking points were targeted, identified, and used to
develop interview questions as the instrument for this study that would identify
leadership engagement aspects, barriers, and concept in the implementation of HROs in
military hospitals. Instrument questions were developed to target how military executive
leaders implemented and maintained HROs in their hospitals.
The researcher conducted interviews to collect the data for this case study.
According to deMarrais and Lapan (2004), interviews are defined as “a process in which
a researcher and participant engage in a conversation focused on questions related to a
research study” (p. 55). Case study interviews along with artifacts sufficed in meeting
the intent of inquiry for the researcher as well as putting forth genuine and nonthreatening
questions in an open-ended matter (Yin, 2014).
The researcher developed an interview protocol and questionnaire that aligned
with the study’s purpose and research questions (Appendix B). According to Yin (2014),
researchers must have sound judgement throughout the data gathering process to
strengthen validity and reliability. To strengthen the use of the instrument in this study,
the researcher developed an interview critique using the participants questionnaire
(Appendix C) and interview observer feedback reflection questionnaire (Appendix D).
The Researcher
The researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis in most
qualitative studies, given the fact that the researcher understands the target of this
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research (Merriam, 2009). As the primary instrument, the researcher has to ask good
questions, be a good listener, and stay open to participant responds. The researcher also
has to have a firm grasp on the issues being studied and avoid bias in order to conduct
research ethically. For this study, it was important to have specific skill sets as the
interviewer, such as the ability to build rapport, the experience of conducting interviews,
and a college degree and/or content knowledge in the field of study (McMillan &
Schumacher, 2010).
The researcher also had experience working with consulting groups, such as the
Studer Group, Huron, and The Arbinger Institute, which were used to help organizations
like Madigan Army Medical Center implement an HRO. During that time, the researcher
assisted each of the consulting groups with teaching and facilitation of materials they
provided to select populations within the organization. The researcher learned how
important consultation with external resources was to implement change to such a large
organization like Madigan let alone a healthcare system much like all of the Puget Sound
military market.
Prior to data collection, the researcher reviewed his specific skills for being the
primary instrument. At the time of this study, the researcher had been a leader in
healthcare for the past decade as a military service member and as a DoD civilian.
During that time, the researcher contributed to the ability to adapt to change and the
ability to look at problems through an ethical lens. The researcher also learned how
important it was to foster and build trusting relationships that respected one another’s
confidentiality. The researcher examined his own personal experiences to become aware
of bias, prejudices, and assumptions (Yin, 2014).
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Validity
According to Yin (2014), “Data triangulation helps to strengthen the construct
validity of your case study” (p. 121). Data triangulation is the use of many data sources
that support findings by documenting codes and themes associated with the case study
(Yin, 2014). The researcher utilized data triangulation in this study by collecting data
from multiple instruments including interviews, documentation, and archival records
(Figure 6).
For the researcher to triangulate the study, many measures were taken into
account to assure internal reliability, including a field test, definitions of common
terminology used, an opportunity for participants to see interview transcripts of their
answers, and practicing observations. Additionally, the researcher sent the interview
protocol and questions (Appendix B) to a committee of doctors for an expert review prior
to sending them to the participants.

Figure 6. Convergence of evidence. Illustrates how multiple sources of evidence corroborated
findings in the case study. From Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th ed.), by R. K.
Yin, 2014, p. 121, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
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Field Testing
A field test was conducted with three senior military healthcare leaders who
possessed the characteristics of this study’s sampling frame and sample but were not
participants of the study. The field-test participants each had over 20 years of experience
working in military healthcare. Their experience expanded to providing patient care and
leadership in every level of military medicine to include work performed stateside and
deployed overseas. They held various senior level leadership positions such as chief
nursing officer, chief of psychiatry, and director of medical services. Each participant led
a number of leaders, interns, and residents.
All three participants of the field test were asked the same questions in the same
order. An additional component conducted during the field test was to include a
questionnaire for participants’ critiques from the interview. The responses provided from
participants gave the researcher feedback on the appropriate amount of time needed to
conduct interviews, coherence of the topic and expertise, and the overall readability of
the instrument (Appendix C).
The field test was observed by a professional researcher with a doctoral degree
and experience in military leadership and healthcare. The observer’s expertise included
being a faculty member for graduate medical education at Madigan Army Medical Center
and a member of the hospital Institutional Review Board (IRB). After each pilot
interview, the interviewee was asked to provide feedback on the clarity of questions, the
interview process, or any additional suggestions that would improve the interview
procedure. The observer gave the same feedback as the participant but also provided
additional input on the researcher’s techniques of asking questions to obtain data.
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Reliability
Reliability is defined as “the consistency and repeatability of the research
procedures used in a case study” (Yin, 2014, p. 240). The researcher ensured reliability
by making sure each participant received an email, telephone call, and face-to-face
explanation of the study and reviewed the interview questions, the interview schedule,
and protocol prior to conducting the interviews. Interview questions that were probing in
nature on topics that military leaders might want to ask more questions about were also
included in the interview protocol. Probing questions were used as an opportunity to ask
for more “detail, clarification or examples” (Yin, 2014, p. 101) regarding the participants’
responses. Participants felt comfortable about asking questions regarding the study. To
keep the interview process organized, the researcher asked the interview questions in the
same order, without modifications, with every participant.
Data Collection
The University of Massachusetts Global Institutional Review Board (UMIRB)
reviewed and approved this research prior to data collection (see Appendix E). For
confidentiality purposes, all participants were informed in advance that all responses to
interviews and artifacts collected would not identify the individual or the individual’s
school site. Protecting the anonymity and confidentiality of participants was of primary
importance.
Human Subject Consideration
The researcher is responsible for all the moral and ethical aspects that go into
conducting educational research (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). Accordingly, the
researcher followed the standards and guidelines set to protect the human subjects who
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participated in the study and obtained a Protecting Human Research Participants
certificate from the National Institutes of Health (Appendix F). Before any data
collection happened, the BUIRB approved the study’s research proposal, protocol, and
interview questions (Appendix E).
The participants invited to participate in the study were asked in person, by
phone, or via email (Appendix G). Participants invited to participate were provided with
a brief description of the study, its purpose, and the information on data collection. Upon
receiving a confirmation from participants who agreed to participate, the researcher
provided them the University of Massachusetts Global Research Participant’s Bill of
Rights (Appendix E), and informed consent form (Appendix H).
In March of 2020, the coronavirus (COVID-19) sparked a global pandemic. All
participants selected for this study were deemed essential workers; therefore, interviews
in person at their place of work was best suited for this study. With permission from the
participants to conduct interviews in person, COVID-19 precautions and safety protocols
were taken to ensure the safety of all who participated in the study.
According to McMillan and Schumacher (2010), researchers must take the
appropriate steps for ensuring confidentiality and the storage of data collected during a
study. The researcher’s consent form (Appendix H) described the confidentiality and the
data storage procedures in depth. Any documentation referencing participants’ names
was securely stored in a locked drawer and was retained for no more than 1 year
following the completion of the study. The researcher disposed of any files associated
with the study appropriately.
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Data Analysis
Qualitative research data collection methods were used for this case study.
Interviews were conducted and analyzed following the qualitative data analysis pattern of
recording data, reviewing of data, coding and categorizing data, and looking for patterns
and themes (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). According to McMillan and Schumacher
(2010), “One characteristic that distinguishes qualitative research from quantitative
research is that the analysis is done during data collection as well as after all the data
have been gathered” (p. 367). Throughout the data collection process, a lot of analysis
was done using computer software. The researcher referenced the purpose statement and
research questions several times to remain focused on the study’s overall purpose.
Interviews were recorded using a digital recording device called an iPhone 11 and
were transcribed using the application named TEMI, which organized the data for
analysis based on the questions and protocol (Appendix B). TEMI is transcription
software that takes recordings and produces a Word document with a full transcription.
The interviews were recorded using a digital device; however, handwritten notes were
taken during the interviews. The notes allowed the researcher to record any body
language or nonverbal cues during the interview. The interviews were recorded with an
observer, transcribed with frequency tables, and coded using NVivo. NVivo is a
qualitative data analysis software designed for identifying rich, text-based themes in the
research. Once the interviews were transcribed and coded using the NVivo software, the
identified themes were organized and analyzed.
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Limitations
All research studies have limitations that can occur and can be expected. Three
limitations occurred during this case study: random sampling did not occur, sample size
was small, and participant interview responses were limited. Because of the limited
number of executive hospital leaders in the Puget Sound military medical market,
participants were chosen from those who were also former executive leaders in the Puget
Sound military medical market for this study. This led to the researcher’s choice of
purposeful sampling over random sampling. Second, the sample size could have been
larger. A small sample size may limit the generalizability to other populations in this
study’s findings. Finally, the findings were limited to the responses that the participants
gave. Participants’ candor in responses may have been limited because of their current
military status or wanting to positively influence the researcher’s findings.
Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the methodology used for the case study
regarding the implementation and maintenance that executive leaders encountered with
the leadership engagement aspects, barriers, and concept in the implementation of HROs
in military hospitals. This chapter defined the purpose of this study by describing the
research questions, research design, study population, and research instruments. An
explanation of the data collected, study limitations, and an analysis of the data completed
the chapter. Chapter IV follows this chapter by specifying the data collection results of
this study.

68

CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH, DATA COLLECTION, AND FINDINGS
Overview
Chapter IV begins by reviewing the purpose of the study, research questions, and
research methodology. This is followed by a review of the study demographics and
presentation of data collected. Chapter IV presents an analysis of the findings collected
from a qualitative case study prospective, which focused on the leadership strategies that
military hospital executive leaders use to engage hospital staff in implementation of the
six principles of High Reliability Organizations (HROs). Three interviews were
conducted with senior executive leaders who held positions that implemented the HRO
principles in military hospitals in the Puget Sound military market. In addition,
Chapter IV reviews frequencies, themes, and patterns that emerged from the interviews
conducted. Chapter IV concludes with a presentation of the data organized by research
questions, which targeted each of the six HRO principles identified in Chapter II. The
chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and explain the
leadership strategies that military hospital executive leaders use to engage hospital staff
in implementation of the six principles of HROs.
Research Questions
1. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was preoccupied with
failure?
2. What strategies did executive leaders use to commit to resiliency?
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3. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was sensitive to
operations?
4. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was deference to
expertise?
5. What strategies did executive leaders use to be reluctant to accept simple explanations
for problems?
6. What strategies did executive leaders use to create a strong safety culture?
Research Methods and Data Collection Procedures
The data gathering process was designed to make participants feel comfortable
and safe. Interviews were conducted in person, face-to-face, following a series of
scripted interview questions established and designed by the researcher, an expert who
has extensive knowledge and experience working in military healthcare, and a University
of Massachusetts Global faculty member. Participants who agreed to participate in this
study confirmed with the researcher and were sent a brief summary about the study
including the interview questions that were asked of them. Data were collected following
these procedures:
1. Participants were identified and approached by the researcher.
2. The researcher shared with participants the purpose of the study and the research
questions. They were informed that the interviews would last 45 to 60 minutes.
3. Participants were provided with the standard University of Massachusetts Global Bill
of Rights (Appendix E) and an informed consent form. These documents outlined the
participants’ rights and explained the risk that was involved, that their participation
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was voluntary and that they may opt out at any time, and the procedures and protocols
for maintaining confidentiality during the study.
4. The researcher scheduled the interviews. The interviews did not begin until the
participant had signed the informed consent form (Appendix H) and had an
opportunity to have any questions answered by the researcher.
5. The researcher followed the interview protocol that was developed (Appendix B).
During the interview, the researcher took notes and recorded the interview using two
devices. The recordings were kept confidential to protect the participants and were
transcribed.
6. The transcripts of the interviews were shared with participants so that they could
review them for accuracy and provide any clarifications or additional information.
The researcher used open-ended and probing questions to obtain meaningful
qualitative data. Upon the completion of the interviews, the transcribed data were input
into NVivo to identify frequencies and themes that emerged from the interviews.
Population
According to McMillan and Schumacher (2010), a population is known as a
group of elements or cases, either individuals, objects, or events, that conform to
particular criteria which is intended to simplify the results of research. Given the
qualitative nature of this research and because there was only a single case investigated,
the study aimed to produce analytical inferences rather than statistical generalizations to a
larger population (Yin, 2014). According to “Medicine and the Military” (n.d.), there are
approximately 44 military hospitals in the continental United States, and three in the
Puget Sound Military Health System. This study targeted a sampling frame from the
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Puget Sound Military Health System, which encompasses three military hospitals.
Military hospitals and clinics are the core of a military health system. Military health
systems were created to improve the access to care and to make an easier way of
supplementing care that is need in a particular geographical area.
Sampling Frame
The sampling frame for a study is the entire set of individuals chosen from the
overall population for which the study data are to be used to make inferences. It is
important that the sampling frame is clearly identified for the purposes of research study
(McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). It is typically not feasible, because of time or cost
constraints, to study large groups; therefore, the researcher chose population samples
from within a larger group. The sampling frame was identified as having unique
characteristics of this case study based on its demographic characteristics (McMillan &
Schumacher, 2010) as being executive leaders who worked in military hospitals during
the implementation of HRO initiatives in the Puget Sound Military Health System.
The Puget Sound Military Health System consists of three military hospitals and a
number of military clinics, which are located in Washington State but provide medical
services to patients throughout other states to include Oregon and California (DHA,
2016). The largest hospital in the Puget Sound Military Health System is Madigan Army
Medical Center. According to Ilic-Godfrey and Lawhorn (2018), the military healthcare
workforce comprises 60% civilian staff compared to the 40% active-duty military staff.
Healthcare is provided to more than 288,500 beneficiaries ensuring military members,
retirees, and families get timely access to the highest quality of healthcare (DHA, 2016).
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To best study this population, the researcher had to be more specific about the
sample, given that the Puget Sound Military Health System has approximately 240
executive leaders who make up the large sampling frame. Not all of the Puget Sound
Military Health System’s executive leaders had direct experience with the
implementation of an HRO during the span of the past 10 years. The sampling frame was
further narrowed to approximately 60 executive leaders who met the study criteria of
direct experience with the implementation of an HRO.
The sampling frame for this study was limited to the three hospitals in the Puget
Sound Military Health System, which has approximately 60 executive leaders altogether.
By interviewing three executive leaders from any of the three Puget Sound Military
Health System hospitals, it was intended that the perceptions and experiences of the
executive leaders would provide insight into how an HRO was implemented. The
researcher hoped to gather feedback from all the different hospitals’ executive leaders or
at least all who have oversight of them.
Sample
A sample is defined as a small group derived from a general population from
which data are gathered (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The study used purposeful
sampling for the qualitative approach. According to McMillan and Schumacher (2010),
purposeful sampling is when the researcher “selects a sample that is representative of the
population or that includes subjects with needed characteristics” (p. 138). Purposeful
sampling was chosen as the method of sample selection based on the criteria used for the
executive leaders. This involves identification and selection of individuals or groups of
individuals who are proficient and well-informed with a phenomenon of interest. In
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addition to knowledge and experience, the importance of availability and willingness to
participate was needed as well as the ability to communicate experiences and opinions in
an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010).
The sample for this study was limited to interviewing no more than three
executive leaders who worked in military hospitals in one of the three Puget Sound
Military Health System hospitals. To gather rich information, purposeful sampling was
used. According to Patten (2012), purposeful sampling is “when researchers purposively
select individuals who they believe will be good sources of information” (p. 51). The
sample selected was based on the leaders’ involvement with the initiatives and
implementation of HROs at their organizations. The sample comprised executive leaders
who had more than 10 years of work experience in the military healthcare systems and
who worked in one of the three Puget Sound Military Health System hospitals. The
sample comprised leaders who held position titles equivalent to community hospital
directors, chief executives, or adjunct senior leaders while the HRO was implemented in
their hospital. One executive leader was selected from each of the three hospitals in the
Puget Sound Military Health System. The sample comprised diverse who had different
ethnicities, ages, and economic backgrounds. This diversity included both military and
civilians who worked in military hospitals.
Demographic Data
The demographic data collected for this research were gathered from interviews
with three senior executive leaders who held executive leadership positions that
implemented an HRO in one of the Puget Sound Military Health System hospitals. All
demographic data collected during the research process that referenced names were
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redacted to ensure the privacy of individuals who participated in this study. In addition,
all of the participants had over 20 years of experience in military service. One participant
had a total of 40 years of federal service, 30 years of which were military service. There
was a range in age groups for the participants; one participant happened to cite the other
as being in a different class group/year group head as physicians in the Army often
reference. All participants identified as White males. The participants had advanced
degrees, all focused on different aspects of medicine. Furthermore, each participant was
assigned a number from 1 through 3 (see Table 2).
Table 2
Participant Demographics
Participant
number

Age

Ethnicity

Educational
background

Years of military
experience

1

40–49

Caucasian

Master’s degreea

21–25

2

50–59

Caucasian

Medical degreeb

26–30

3

60–65

Caucasian

Medical degreec

26–30

a

Master of Science in Nursing (MSN). bDoctor of Osteopathic Medicine (DO). cDoctor of
Medicine (MD).

Presentation and Analysis of Data
A qualitative case study approach led the researcher in gathering information
from three participants by conducting in-person interviews. The information gathered
corresponded to all six HRO principles in specific categories: (a) strategies executive
leaders used to create an HRO that was preoccupied with failure, (b) strategies executive
leaders used to commit to resiliency, (c) strategies executive leaders used to create an
HRO that was sensitive to operations, (d) strategies executive leaders used to create an
HRO that was deference to expertise, (e) strategies executive leaders used to be reluctant
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to accept simple explanations for problems, and (f) strategies executive leaders used to
create a strong safety culture. Each major category had themes emerge that provided
detailed information introduced to the study and that were supported by study
participants’ quotes. Themes were presented for study inclusion based on the frequency
with which the themes emerged from transcribed in-person interviews that were
conducted. During the analysis of the data, it became clear that several themes emerged
within all the interviews. Additional themes emerged; however, if themes were not
mentioned by two out of three of the participants or 67%, the themes were not included in
the tables.
Data by Research Question
The presentation and analysis of data were organized by the research questions
used in the study. The researcher identified and extracted themes using the qualitative
data software analysis NVivo for each category. The themes were identified based on
frequencies. For example, if a theme appeared across the interviews two or more time, it
was included in the tables. If a theme appeared only one time in the interviews, it was
excluded from the frequency tables in the data analysis sections for each research
question.
The coding process resulted in 13 themes as the researcher explored an
understanding of the participants’ perceptions of each research question related to the
principles of HRO. The research produced much needed data in the form of codes, which
resulted in 45 interview transcript frequencies and three artifact data frequency sources.
All of the themes and frequencies were distributed and covered the six principles of
HRO, which include the themes of covers the preoccupation with failure, commitment to
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resiliency, sensitivity to operations, deference to expertise, reluctance to accept simple
explanations for problems, and creating a strong safety culture. Figure 7 shows the
distribution of each theme among the six principles of HRO studied. Figure 8 illustrates
the frequency count for each variable.
Emerging themes were determined first as those referenced by a minimum of two
or more of the participants or 67%. After two or more participants referenced a theme,
the researcher determined an emerging theme to also include the frequency for which
each theme was referenced by the participants to demonstrate the importance of themes.
Using this focus approach, the researcher was able to use the most frequently referenced
codes within themes for the study.

Themes and Frequencies

Preoccupation
with failure
(3 Themes)

Creating a strong
safety culture
(3 Themes)

Reluctance to accept
simple explanations for
problems
( 1 Theme)
Deference to
expertise
(2 Themes)

Commitment to
resiliency
(3 Themes)
Sensitivity to
operations
(1 Theme)

Figure 7. Number of themes that emerged in each HRO principle.
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Figure 7 shows that three themes emerged for the HRO principles of
preoccupation with failure, commitment to resiliency, and creating a strong safety
culture. Likewise, two themes emerged for the HRO principle of deference to expertise.
Unexpectedly, only one theme emerged for the HRO principles of sensitivity to
operations and reluctance to accept simple explanations for problems.

Total Frequencies for each HRO
Principle

Creating a strong
safety culture

Preoccupation with
failure
15
12
9
6
3
0

Reluctance to accept
simple explanations
for problems

Commitment to
resiliency

Sensitivity to
operations
Deference to
expertise

Figure 8. Total number of frequencies for each HRO principle.

The total frequencies of themes being referenced for each HRO principle is shown
in Figure 8. The highest frequency for the HRO principle preoccupation with failure with
15 references or 33.3% of the total references made. The second highest frequencies
were for the HRO principles commitment to resiliency and creating a strong safety
culture with both having nine references or 20% of the total references made. The next
highest frequency was for the HRO principle deference to expertise with eight references
or 17.7% of the total references made. Last, the lowest frequencies were for the HRO
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principles sensitivity to operations and reluctance to accept simple explanations for
problems with both having three references or 6.6% of the total references made. In
order to best illustrate the data, emerging themes were categorized based on each research
question, which explored strategies used by executive leaders in implementing all six of
the HRO principles. A detailed analysis of the researcher’s interview data is outlined by
research question in the following sections.
Data Analysis for Research Question 1
Research Question 1 asked, “What strategies did executive leaders use to create
an HRO that was preoccupied with failure?”
Three major themes emerged that were identified as strategies executive leaders
used to create an HRO that was preoccupied with failure. The three major themes
identified were based on the frequency of how executive leaders used past experiences in
becoming preoccupied with not repeating past failures and technology into identified
lessons learned that could prevent failures (see Table 3).
Table 3
Research Question 1 Interview Results for the HRO Principle of Being Preoccupied With Failure
Participant
frequency

Frequency
total

Source
type

Used past experiences

3/3

7

Interview

Utilized technology

3/3

5

Interview/artifact

Highlighted patient experiences

2/3

3

Interview

Theme

Table 3 represents the three themes that emerged from the data-coding process for
the HRO principle of being preoccupied with failure. Emerging themes were determined
first by a minimum of two or more of the participants referencing the themes. The three
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themes that emerged were then broken down further based on how many times they were
referenced by participants. The three themes that emerged represented a frequency rate
of 33.3% or more based on responses. The data showed that executive leaders were
successful with implementing the HRO principle of being preoccupied with failure by
using various resources to include themselves for examining failures. Figure 9 shows
each emergent theme in further detail and gives voice to the perceptions of the study
participants.

Preoccupied with Failure Frequencies
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Used past experiences

Utilized technology

Highlighted Patient
Experiences

Figure 9. Themes and frequencies for being preoccupied with failure.

Research findings indicate that past experiences were a dominate theme reflecting
on executive leaders for how they created an HRO that was preoccupied with failures.
All of the interview participants identified past failures that they used to create the
emphasis of learning from and/or to focus on preventing mistakes from happening again
in the future. As Participant 2 noted, “I’d seen years and years of failings all the time
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without preventive measures put in place to stop the failings.” Participant 2’s views were
shared by all participants, using different words. Participant 3 stated,
Failure is a part of life. As a leader I need to be able to accept that as a reality.
The real failure comes when we don’t learn from our past mistakes. Instead, we
pontificate about our mistakes and errors instead of actually learning from them.
… This preoccupation with failure in implementing HRO forced us to learn from
our past mistakes and to become humble of such failures.
Research findings also indicate that technology was a way for executive leaders to
know how to create an HRO that was preoccupied with failures. Surprisingly, all
participants identified different technological systems that help prevent failures.
Participant 1 pointed out, “Yeah. I witnessed years of my peers who maybe weren’t so
technical or technologically savvy struggle with [electronic health records] EHRs, but it
was a system that helped make sure you didn’t mess up a prescription.”
The patients’ experiences were highlighted to capture their perceptions of seeing
the hospital as failing. Gathering this point of view from patients allowed leaders to get
an inside look from the patients’ first person contact to their follow-up, postsurgery
check. Participant 1 shared that patients who come in and get the necessary medications
or treatment they need could still result in a failure if their experience in doing so was
horrific. Participant 3 noted that patient experience was the reason why most healthcare
professions place an emphasis on building rapport and bedside manner. By patients
having great experiences, a therapeutic alliance can be created and will keep a patient
coming back when they are ill or injured in the future.
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Data Analysis for Research Question 2
Research Question 2 asked, “What strategies did executive leaders use to commit
to resiliency?”
Three major themes that were identified as strategies executive leaders used to
commit to resiliency emerged from the second research question. The three major
themes identified were based on the frequency of how executive leaders highlighted past
failures in respect to reliantly bouncing back from those failures, providing resiliency
training that helped put things into perspective for subordinates, peers, and leaders alike
and set the expectation that leaders would do rounding with staff to identify any stressors
that could be reduced (see Table 4).
Table 4
Research Question 2 Interview Results for the HRO Principle of Commitment to Resiliency?
Participant
frequency

Frequency
total

Source
type

Highlighted past failures

3/3

4

Interview

Provided resiliency training

3/3

3

Interview

Leader rounding

2/3

2

Interview

Theme

Table 4 represents the three themes that emerged from the data-coding process for
the HRO principle of commitment to resiliency. Emerging themes were determined first
by a minimum of two or more of the participants referencing the themes. The three
themes that emerged were then broken down further based on how many times they were
referenced by participants. The three themes that emerged represented a frequency rate
of 20% or more based on responses. The data showed that executive leaders were
successful with implementing the HRO principle of commitment to resiliency by looking
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at past failures, doing rounding on staff, and looking ahead as to how they could improve
resiliency with training. Figure 10 shows each emergent theme in further detail and gives
voice to the perceptions of the study participants.

Commitment to Resiliency Frequencies
5

4

3

2

1

0
Highlighted past failures

Provided resiliency training

Leader rounding

Figure 10. Themes and frequencies of commitment to resiliency.

The major themes that emerged from the interview results pointed toward the
ways in which executive leaders defined resiliency and the way in which resiliency is
perceived. Resiliency is used as a tool that helps all commit to what Participant 1
identified as “bouncing back” from failures, mistakes, or mishaps. Resiliency training
was the primary way executive leaders themselves learned to implement the objective
perception of failures and the subjective application of moving past those failures. A
resiliency training that was developed by the University of Pennsylvania is held regularly
for all leaders to learn about how resiliency can change the workplace. The purpose of
the workshop is to help leaders implement steps for facilitating conversations with staff
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to commit to resiliency and to cover various topics such as goal setting, problem-solving,
optimism, and so forth. Participant 1 expanded on the resiliency training:
Resiliency is truly more than just focusing on what we have failed at. Resiliency
requires us to develop core competencies that improve our performance. Some of
those core competencies include self-awareness, self-regulation, and selfactualization. While the University of Pennsylvania has developed programs, that
military leaders can follow step by step with implementing, it will require much
more than that and continued training. Resiliency is not a one and done training,
just like failure is not something I will see only once in my career. Failures
happen because of the breakdown in the connection of developing relationships
and seeking help while giving help.
Participant 3 put things in perspective by highlighting past failures. According to
Participant 3,
Patient safety trends I think are improving. We have fewer of the potentially
compensable events than we did in the past. What I mean by compensable events
is malpractice lawsuits or mistakes that result in compensation being put forth as a
resolution. The typical finding for patient safety events in my experience has
been the lack of effective communication. Since this has been the primary
leading cause to compensable events, leaders have highlighted those compensable
events with charts, Powerpoints, and briefings to prevent them from happening
again and move past them. For example, look at the new medical record; it makes
things a lot more difficult for a physician to become aware of allergies or risks
when giant banners flash at you. Somebody found the good stuff by highlighting
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a compensable event and put serious thought in problem-solving things versus
just complaining.
Lastly, leader rounding was identified as a way to build resiliency within
hospitals. Leader rounding allows for executive leaders to get to know their staff,
identify any stressors they may have, and to build trust among one another. This is very
important if leaders want staff to express when they see something not being done right.
Participant 1 spoke about the benefit of leader rounding by highlighting the fact that at
first it had leaders asking questions they would not normally ask such as how things are
going, whether there are any barriers that are causing delay with work, and seeing
whether there is anyone that should be recognized. Participant 2 spoke about the
“accessibility to leadership” leader rounding brings. There is a sense of validation for
staff to know that their leaders recognize what is happening not only with them
professionally but also with them personally in the leader rounding conversations, and
there is a potential for staff to get the support that they need before mistakes could be
made.
Data Analysis for Research Question 3
Research Question 3 asked, “What strategies did executive leaders use to create
an HRO that was sensitive to operations?”
Research findings reveal that only one major theme emerged that identified as a
strategy executive leaders used to create an HRO that was sensitive to operations. The
major theme identified was based on the frequency of how executive leaders emphasized
the process for reporting errors. The results are delineated in Table 5.
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Table 5
Research Question 3 Interview Results for the HRO Principle of Sensitivity to Operations

Theme

Participant
frequency

Frequency
total

Source
type

3/3

3

Interview

Placed an emphasis on reporting
errors/mistakes

Table 5 represents the theme that emerged from the data-coding process for the
HRO principle of sensitivity to operations. The emerging theme was determined first by
a minimum of two or more of the participants referencing the themes. The one theme
that emerged was broken down further based on how many times it was referenced by
participants. The one theme that emerged represented a frequency rate of 6.6% or more
based on responses. The data showed that executive leaders were successful with
implementing the HRO principle of sensitivity to operations by identifying the needs for
reporting mistakes. Figure 11 shows the emergent theme in further detail and gives voice
to the perceptions of the study participants.
The major theme reported from interview results was the various ways for which
leaders and staff could emphasize reporting errors. Participant 1 stated that most of the
errors were “small potato” things, for example, reporting when there was a breakdown in
communication between the transfer station and admitting doctors and their nurses. The
simple break of communication could result in over an hour for a patient to wait to be
admitted. Participant 1 went on to speak about the resolution that came from reporting by
saying that back channel solutions are easier to come by and accomplish when they are
shared with all. Participant 2 noted, “I think with the emphasis on using different
reporting systems, it’s much easier to be heard.” Finally, Participant 3 commented on the
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need to be more accommodating so that staff do not have to use work-arounds to address
issues that need to be tended to.

Sensitivity to operations Frequencies
4

3

2

1

0
Placed an emphasis on reporting errors/mistakes

Figure 11. Theme and frequency of sensitivity to operations.

Data Analysis for Research Question 4
Research Question 4 asked, “What strategies did executive leaders use to create
an HRO that was deference to expertise?”
The interview results, which centered on the fourth research question, revealed
two major themes: committees/workgroups/teams and consultation with subject matter
experts (see Table 6).
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Table 6
Research Question 4 Interview Results for the HRO Principle of Deference to Expertise
Participant
frequency

Frequency
total

Source
type

Created committees/workgroups/teams

3/3

5

Interview/artifact

Consulted with subject matter experts
(SME)

3/3

3

Interview

Theme

Table 6 represents the two themes that emerged from the data-coding process for
the HRO principle of deference to expertise. Emerging themes were determined first by
a minimum of two or more of the participants referencing the themes. The two themes
that emerged were broken down further based on how many times they were referenced
by participants. The two themes that emerged represented a frequency rate of 20% or
more based on responses. The data showed that executive leaders were successful with
implementing the HRO principle of deference to expertise by identifying experts needed
and in many cases bringing together a group of experts. Figure 12 shows each emergent
theme in further detail and gives voice to the perceptions of the study participants.
The most noticeable theme identified from the interview results point toward
committees, workgroups, or teams being strategies for which executive leaders deferred
to expertise. The main reason is because as opposed to seeking out which expert is most
qualified or to up to date with a specialty case; its best to bring together a collective of
experts to defer to expertise. Participant 1 highlighted the fact that committees,
workgroups, and teams help with “presenting as a unified front” on topics that could
benefit from the deference of multiple experts. Participant 2 went on to speak about
trends that reoccur on a weekly, monthly, and quarterly basis that need the deference of
expertise. Such trends included ethics committees for management of very ill patients,
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the various workgroups that help address technological issues when they arise, and the
many teams of experts that innovate the documentation standards for the EHR.

Deference to Expertise Frequencies
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Created committees/workgroups/teams

Consulted with subject matter experts (SME)

Figure 12. Themes and frequencies of deference to expertise

The other identified theme is consulting with subject matter experts (SMEs).
Within healthcare there are a number of specialties and subspecialties. Participant 3
expressed the need for executive leaders and staff to show humility by knowing what is
within their scope of practice and deferring to experts when things are out of their scope.
In order to best explain this, Participant 3 gave the example of how staff should trust their
leader to defer when their leader is a primary care provider but has questions referring to
other specialties (e.g., Psychiatry, Podiatry, Neurology, etc.). That leader should have a
wherewithal to defer the questions beyond asking other primary care providers and bring
in the other specialty providers to answer questions that are within their scope.
Participant 2 spoke to something similar to this relating to why many providers have
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subspecialties in order to further the growth of medicine. Lastly, Participant 1 stated,
“SMEs in the various guilds of healthcare help to keep everyone, to include the top
leaders, from making mistakes which is HRO in and of itself.”
Data Analysis for Research Question 5
Research Question 5 asked, “What strategies did executive leaders use to be
reluctant to accept simple explanations for problems?”
The interview results centered on the major theme of reviewing policies. The
large majority of the military runs by following policy that gives direction in order to
prevent problems. It is through the review of policies that executive leaders were able to
demonstrate reluctance (see Table 7).
Table 7
Research Question 5 Interview Results for the HRO Principle of Reluctance to Accept Simple
Explanations for Problems

Theme
Policy reviews

Participant
frequency

Frequency
total

Source
type

3/3

3

Interview

Table 7 represents the theme that emerged from the data-coding process for the
HRO principle of reluctance to accept simple explanations for problems. The emerging
theme was determined first by a minimum of two or more of the participants referencing
the theme. The one theme that emerged was broken down further based on how many
times it was referenced by participants. The one theme that emerged represented a
frequency rate of 6.6% or more based on responses. The data showed that executive
leaders were successful with implementing the HRO principle of reluctance to accept
simple explanations for problems by reviewing policies to ensure they are in effect and
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do not create barriers. Figure 13 shows the emergent theme in further detail and gives
voice to the perceptions of the study participants.

Reluctance to accept simple explanations for
problems Frequencies
4

3

2

1

0
Policy reviews

Figure 13. Themes and frequencies of reluctance to accept simple explanations for problems.

The reluctance to accept a simple explanation is what many executive leaders
struggle with. Participant 1 spoke about this:
Sometimes certain products like TeamSTEPPS, online communication tools,
[Situation, Background, Assessment, and Recommendation] SBAR forms and
such have an HRO element built into them. However, that’s not necessarily
something that our partner facilities use so they can interfere with the flow of
patient, staff, and leader interactions.
Participant 1 went on to elaborate that the problems that have come out using various
products, which have been put into policy, have had many senior leaders reluctant to
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accept simple explanations. Therefore, continual policy reviews must happen throughout
all levels of the organization in order for the HRO to be achieved and maintained.
Participant 2 identified policy review as being critical because the number of
barriers that leaders in healthcare must deal with is “unbelievable.” Policies allow for
simple solutions to turn into actionable things, such as the right of first refusal for
Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) to send patients out to the network for care. Policy
review however allows for leaders to explore the secondary and tertiary effects of what a
policy’s simple solutions may have created.
Data Analysis for Research Question 6
Research Question 6 asked, “What strategies did executive leaders use to create a
strong safety culture?”
The interview results centered on three major themes of creating educational
opportunities, working in multidisciplinary teams, and conducting training exercises.
Educational opportunities allow for leaders and staff to continue learning to practice safer
and better healthcare. The ability to work in multidisciplinary teams builds a stronger
safety culture by allowing safety to be viewed in a different lense while conducting
training exercises tests leaders and staff abilities in a practice setting (see Table 8).
Table 8
Research Question 6 Interview Results for the HRO Principle of Creating a Strong Safety Culture
Participant
frequency

Frequency
total

Source
type

Educational opportunities

3/3

3

Interview

Multidisciplinary teams

3/3

3

Interview

Training exercises

2/3

3

Interview

Theme
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Table 8 represents the three themes that emerged from the data-coding process for
the HRO principle of creating a strong safety culture. Emerging themes were determined
first by a minimum of two or more of the participants referencing the themes. The three
themes that emerged were broken down further based on how many times they were
referenced by participants. The three themes that emerged represented a frequency rate
of 20% or more based on responses. The data showed that executive leaders were
successful with implementing the HRO principle of creating a strong safety culture by
using various strategies for creating controlled environments for which staff could learn
and practice safely. Figure 14 shows each emergent theme in further detail and gives
voice to the perceptions of the study participants.

Creating a Strong Safety Culture Frequencies
4

3

2

1

0
Educational opportunities

Multidisciplinary teams

Training Exercises

Figure 14. Themes and frequencies of creating a strong safety culture.

Each of the three major themes points toward creating a strong safety culture.
The theme of educational opportunities does wonders according to Participant 1 by
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“Teaching staff and leaders how to be better.” This was further explained that as a
leader, much like being a physician, there is supervision involved, training to a degree,
and quality assurance provided for the work that is done. Healthcare providers must do
all of this, and being afforded the dedicated time is important. Participant 2 talked about
the importance of being taking advantage of in education opportunities because as a
physician this is a continual education aspect that is required in order to maintain a
license to practice medicine. These education requirements that necessitate physicians
and many other healthcare providers to take often cover various safety aspects such as
universal precautions, bioterrorism, end of life, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OHSA) practices, ethics, and pain management.
The theme of multidisciplinary teams hones in on the fact that within
multidisciplinary teams in hospitals there would be physicians, nurses, various specialty
technicians, and therapists viewing safety from differing perspectives. Participant 3
spoke about the diversity of having people with different professions on a team help
leaders “trust but verify” the safety not only of the patients but also of the culture within
the hospital is being upheld to the highest standard. Additionally, Participant 1
mentioned that there are those who are competent in their particular skill set and those
who are not, so the more diverse the multidisciplinary team is in terms of skills, the better
the platform can be in creating a safety culture that is broad reaching across both clinical
and administrative actions throughout the organization.
The final theme that emerged was conducting training exercises, which narrows
the field of leaders and staff being put through practical exercises that simulate real-world
events. By conducting training exercises, this allows leaders and staff to demonstrate
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what and how they practice healthcare in a controlled setting. If errors are made, leaders
and staff can learn from them and not cause real harm. Participant 2 mentioned that
training exercises are a big part in the way the military learns. Participant 2 stated, “You
don’t know what to expect until you’re doing it for the first time in training,” highlighting
the true value in being able to practice medicine in a training exercise with others
overseeing and watching to ensure that protocols are followed safely. Additionally,
Participant 1 noted that all healthcare professionals usually learn about medicine in
phases such as “Crawl, Walk, Run” or “See one, Do one.” Practical training exercises
allow for leaders and staff to learn their healthcare crafts using these phrases. In an
organization like a military hospital where at a given moment’s notice everyone should
be ready to deploy to fight and win wars, it is vital that everyone be trained and prepared
to do so.
Summary
The research findings reveal that executive leaders used numerous strategies to
implement HROs within their hospitals. Executive leaders used different strategies for
different HRO principles. However, there were a number of obstacles, objects, and
barriers that posed challenges. Through the exploration of strategies for each HRO
principle, there were similar strategies in common among each of the study participants
that were explained. The difficulty of implementing various strategies for all six
principles of HRO, while assisting or caring for patients as healthcare professionals, can
be applied to all executive leaders and should be taken into consideration at all times.
Having utilized the strategies identified, leaders implementing HROs in their
hospitals would be able to adopt strategies similar for all six of the principles for the
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HRO. Preparing for change and having a change initiative to follow to ensure the
implementation of a major healthcare initiative like HROs would also help to ensure its
success. Senior executive leaders need to have some sort of structured path to follow as
the HRO is implemented because there are six principles that can overlap with each other
if not careful. The ability to think outside the box for how to appropriately gain buy in of
an HRO is important but need not lose sight of the overall purpose of an HRO, which is
preventing errors.
Senior executive leaders interviewed identified various other strategies used for
promoting and implementing other changes. However, based upon the criteria in this
study, the researcher only accepted strategies used for implementation of the six
principles of the HRO. The change process used by leaders is similar to that of Kotter’s
change model. Chapter V discusses the major findings in greater detail and illuminates
the unexpected findings and conclusions. In addition, the chapter discusses implications
for action and recommends further research based on major findings. Finally, Chapter V
ends with concluding remarks and reflections.
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CHAPTER V: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter V begins with a review of the purpose of the study, the research
questions, and the research methodology. Chapter V presents an analysis of the study’s
major findings and unexpected findings, followed by conclusions and implications for
action. In addition, Chapter V outlines recommendations for further research, and finally,
the study ends with concluding remarks and reflections.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and explain the
leadership strategies that military hospital executive leaders use to engage hospital staff
in implementation of the six principles of High Reliability Organizations (HROs).
Research Questions
1. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was preoccupied with
failure?
2. What strategies did executive leaders use to commit to resiliency?
3. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was sensitive to
operations?
4. What strategies did executive leaders use to create an HRO that was deference to
expertise?
5. What strategies did executive leaders use to be reluctant to accept simple explanations
for problems?
6. What strategies did executive leaders use to create a strong safety culture?
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Research Methods and Data Collection Procedures
The data gathering process was designed to make participants feel comfortable
and safe. Interviews were conducted in person, face-to-face, following a series of
scripted interview questions established and designed by the researcher, an expert who
has extensive knowledge and experience working in military healthcare, and a University
of Massachusetts Global faculty member. Participants who agreed to participate in this
study confirmed with the researcher and were sent a brief summary about the study
including the interview questions that were asked of them. Data were collected following
these procedures:
1. Participants were identified and approached by the researcher.
2. The researcher shared with participants the purpose of the study and the research
questions. They were informed that the interviews would last 45 to 60 minutes.
3. Participants were provided with the standard University of Massachusetts Global Bill
of Rights (Appendix E) and an informed consent form. These documents outlined the
participants’ rights and explained the risk that was involved, that their participation
was voluntary and that they may opt out at any time, and the procedures and protocols
for maintaining confidentiality during the study.
4. The researcher scheduled the interview. The interviews did not begin until the
participant had signed the informed consent form (Appendix H) and had an
opportunity to have any questions answered by the researcher.
5. The researcher followed the interview protocol that was developed (Appendix B).
During the interview, the researcher took notes and recorded the interview using two
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devices. The recordings were kept confidential to protect the participants and were
transcribed.
6. The transcripts of the interviews were shared with participants so they could review
them for accuracy and provide any clarifications or additional information.
The researcher used open-ended and probing questions to obtain meaningful
qualitative data. Upon the completion of the interviews, the transcribed data were input
into NVivo to identify frequencies and themes that emerged from the interviews.
Population
According to McMillan and Schumacher (2010), a population is known as a
group of elements or cases, either individuals, objects, or events, that conform to
particular criteria for which it is intended to simplify the results of research. Given the
qualitative nature of this research and because there was only a single case investigated,
the study aimed to produce analytical inferences rather than statistical generalizations to a
larger population (Yin, 2014). According to “Medicine and the Military” (n.d.), there are
approximately 44 military hospitals in the continental United States, and three in the
Puget Sound Military Health System. This study targeted a sampling frame from the
Puget Sound Military Health System, which encompasses three military hospitals.
Military hospitals and clinics are the core of a military health system. Military health
systems were created to improve the access to care and to make an easier way of
supplementing care that is need in a particular geographical area.
Sampling Frame
The sampling frame for a study is the entire set of individuals chosen from the
overall population for which the study data are to be used to make inferences. It is
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important that the sampling frame is clearly identified for the purposes of research study
(McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). It is typically not feasible, because of time or cost
constraints, to study large groups; therefore, the researcher chose population samples
from within a larger group. The sampling frame was identified as having unique
characteristics of this case study based on its demographic characteristics (McMillan &
Schumacher, 2010) as being executive leaders who worked in military hospitals during
the implementation of HRO initiatives in the Puget Sound Military Health System.
The Puget Sound Military Health System consists of three military hospitals and a
number of military clinics, which are located in Washington State but provide medical
services to patients throughout other states to include Oregon and California (DHA,
2016). The largest hospital in the Puget Sound Military Health System is Madigan Army
Medical Center. According to Ilic-Godfrey and Lawhorn (2018), the military healthcare
workforce comprises 60% civilian staff compared to the 40% active-duty military staff.
Healthcare is provided to more than 288,500 beneficiaries ensuring military members,
retirees, and families get timely access to the highest quality of healthcare (DHA, 2016).
To best study this population, the researcher had to be more specific about the
sample, given that the Puget Sound Military Health System has approximately 240
executive leaders who make up the large sampling frame. Not all of the Puget Sound
Military Health System’s executive leaders had direct experience with the
implementation of an HRO during the span of the past 10 years. The sampling frame was
further narrowed to approximately 60 executive leaders who met the study criteria of
direct experience with the implementation of an HRO.
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The sampling frame for this study was limited to the three hospitals in the Puget
Sound Military Health System, which has approximately 60 executive leaders all
together. By interviewing three executive leaders from any of the three Puget Sound
Military Health System hospitals, it was intended that the perceptions and experiences of
the executive leaders would provide insight into how an HRO was implemented. The
researcher hoped to gather feedback from all the different hospitals’ executive leaders or
at least all who have oversight of them.
Sample
A sample is defined as a small group derived from a general population from
which data are gathered (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The study used purposeful
sampling for the qualitative approach. According to McMillan and Schumacher (2010),
purposeful sampling is when the researcher “selects a sample that is representative of the
population or that includes subjects with needed characteristics” (p. 138). Purposeful
sampling was chosen as the method of sample selection based on the criteria used for the
executive leaders. This involves identification and selection of individuals or groups of
individuals who are proficient and well-informed with a phenomenon of interest. In
addition to knowledge and experience, the importance of availability and willingness to
participate was needed as well as the ability to communicate experiences and opinions in
an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010).
The sample for this study was limited to interviewing no more than three
executive leaders who worked in military hospitals in one of the three Puget Sound
Military Health System hospitals. To gather rich information, purposeful sampling was
used. According to Patten (2012), purposeful sampling is “when researchers purposively
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select individuals who they believe will be good sources of information” (p. 51). The
sample selected was based on the leaders’ involvement with the HRO initiatives and
implementation of the HRO at their organizations. The sample comprised executive
leaders who had more than 10 years of work experience in the military healthcare
systems and who worked in one of the three Puget Sound Military Health System
hospitals. The sample comprised leaders who held position titles equivalent to
community hospital directors, chief executives, or adjunct senior leaders while an HRO
was implemented in their hospital. One executive leader was selected from each of the
three hospitals in the Puget Sound Military Health System. The sample comprised
diverse leaders who had different ethnicities, ages, and economic backgrounds. This
diversity includes both military and civilians who worked in military hospitals.
Major Findings
After collecting all the data, analyzing the data, and reviewing the literature, the
researcher made the following seven key findings, which were based on frequent trends
executive leaders faced with implementing all of the HRO principles.
Major Finding 1: Preoccupation With Failure Requires Resources
Based on the findings, preoccupation with failure will require extensive resources
in order for executive leaders to learn from failures and adjust as to prevent them from
happening in the future. This reluctance to embrace new initiatives is common within the
healthcare industry because of the education, training, and cost associated with
implementing the HRO (Oster & Deakins, 2018; Oster et al., 2016). The need for all
these resources makes executive leaders skeptical about being able to provide the
continued resources toward being preoccupied with failure. Therefore, executive leaders
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must frequently rely on their past experiences to help when faced with catastrophic
mistakes. These past experiences are not always the sure way for preventing failures or
addressing mistakes, and they do take up a lot of time. The use of different technological
systems does help prevent failure by catching things such as wrong prescriptions or
tracking past mistakes.
The implementation of an HRO must include all the essential components such as
improved procedures, training team members, upgrading technology, and sustaining
performance and quality for the long term (Studer, 2008). Major Finding 1 identifies a
perceived gap in executive leader beliefs that there was adequately required resources to
continue to be preoccupied with failure. The fact that executive leaders were able to
implement an HRO with the given resources they had does not mean that they were
adequate. Therefore, major change initiatives like HROs require what leaders deem as
adequate resources to prevent regression and to secure a positive position with staff for
change to be effective (Kotter, 2012).
Major Finding 2: Resiliency is Fundamental
Based on the findings, resiliency is fundamental and needs to be a major focus for
executive leaders to help staff overcome errors, mistakes, or potential mistakes that they
uncover. The researcher found that executive leaders are resilient and use resiliency as a
fundamental tool for being able to highlight past experiences and learn from them.
Knowing that errors and mistakes will be made, the commitment to resilience in HROs
expands past errors allowing organizations to demonstrate that they can identify potential
threats from repeating themselves and mitigate the seriousness of a failure from
happening again (PSNet, n.d.). By training staff on being committed to resiliency, this
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fundamental tool covers goal setting, problem-solving, and optimism on how to bounce
back from mistakes or failures. Additionally, resiliency is about staff building strong
connections and relationships with one another (Craig, 2021). Leaders and staff should
be comfortable sharing when they make mistakes or have accomplishments. Resiliency
acknowledges a reactionary mindset of organizations coping with postfailures (Ford,
2018). Therefore, resiliency promotes an open and trusting communication forum about
mistakes that helps lead HROs to being zero error.
Major Finding 3: Reporting Needs to be Simple
Based on the findings, reporting needs to be simple for staff to report the errors,
mistakes, or potential mistakes that they uncover. Aside from reporting being simple for
staff, the ability for the reports to be tracked and resolved by leadership needs to be
simple as well. The fact that there is little data shared by the participants correlates with
the fact that even the leaders are sensitive to operations. According to Lawton and Parker
(2002), reporting in healthcare is how healthcare staff achieve better success from
learning from the mistakes they make. The National Health Service organization
demonstrates this by showing that its reporting systems are complicated and currently
provide incomplete data on some of the failures in healthcare (Lawton & Parker, 2002).
By using better reporting systems that are simple, it will be easier for staff to report.
Major Finding 4: Trust the Experts
Executive leaders in HROs are experts at what they do. The major finding that
came from the data is that leaders need to trust in their staff because they are also experts.
Leaders that engage in creating organizational environments that value trust among
leaders, managers, and staff can help with improving cohesion, communication, and
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achieving goals (Kristin et al., 2015). By leaders trusting in their staff, they help with
presenting a unified front when addressing all of the complexity and acuity that HRO
hospitals need to be focused on. According to Kotter (2012), leaders and managers
cannot do everything in an organization by themselves. HRO success is built from the
trust and cohesions that one another has.
Major Finding 5: Policies Provide Solutions
Based on the findings, policies provider solutions for errors, mistakes, and
potential mistakes. Policy reviews lead to less HRO complications and more solutions.
Policies are meant to outline how healthcare is supposed to be provided for executive
leaders and staff (Fetzer et al., 2018; Gray & Sullivan, 2011). Executive leaders can
learn from policies and the various government agencies that help to govern healthcare.
The Joint Commission has a number of governing affiliates such as The American
College of Physicians (ACP), The American Dental Association (ADA), The American
Hospital Association (AHA), and The American Medical Association (AMA) that are
points of reference for which the majority of healthcare policies are developed from
(Slayton-Robinson, 2017; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006). By executive
leaders conducting more policy reviews in light of errors, mistakes, and problems
happening, they may find that things could have been prevented if the policy was
reviewed in advance. Executive leaders are also able to ensure that policies they have do
not create additional burdens. An HRO has hospitals conduct internal processes that
prevent errors from happening (Quigley & White, 2013). Solutions for how things in
healthcare are resolved are usually annotated in policies, but the lack of reviewing
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policies appears to be far to common. In many cases, policy provides the simplest
explanations for problems.
Major Finding 6: Improved Patient Safety Trends
Executive leaders have the perception that patient safety trends have continued
improving with the implementation of an HRO. Their perceptions are based on the fact
that there are more training opportunities for staff about patient care and safety.
According to The Joint Commission (n.d.), overall patient safety trends increased from
81% in 2017 to 89% in 2019 because of hospitals that implemented and maintained
HROs. Additionally, executive leaders believe that there are fewer potentially
compensable events than in the past because of the strong safety culture the HRO creates.
The typical finding for patient safety events come from the lack of effective
communication and the lack of medical resources available to a patient. As a result of an
HRO being implemented, an emphasis on the use of multidisciplinary teams has been
created. Patient safety in organizations like hospitals is learned and improved upon when
identified and examined for weaknesses such as safety (Frankel et al., 2006). A focus on
improving various elements like medical documentation, diverse care teams, and
continual education help continue to reduce risk and improve patient safety trends.
Unexpected Findings
There are three unexpected findings that surfaced from the interviews in this
study. The first unexpected finding is that leaders are skeptical as to how long this
healthcare initiative, HRO, would last within the healthcare industry. One thing that was
prevalent is that each of the participants interviewed had experience implementing other
healthcare initiatives that have now seemed to have been overlooked with an HRO. A
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few examples of those other major healthcare initiatives are preventative care, isolated
wellness programs, and big data to name a few. The implementation of electronic health
records (EHRs) is the only other major healthcare initiative that still has traction and is
continuing to evolve. With the COVID-19 global pandemic forcing the need for more
virtual-based healthcare, leaders are trying to envision the future of healthcare, which
may lead to new healthcare initiatives that are cyber based.
The second unexpected finding is that funding plays a vital role in how hospitals
run and how leaders make decisions. The Military and Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) are some of the largest socialized medical platforms in the United States.
Socialized medical platforms therefore run off deficits and do not create incentives for
staff to provide more care because there is no fiscal incentives for staff to do so. Funding
for these medical platforms is essentially guaranteed depending on how Congress
allocates funds. Federally tax funded infrastructure makes it difficult to implement major
innovations like HROs because the resources need to expound upon such things and is
often clouded by the fact that funding is already appropriated for other programs.
The third unexpected finding is that senior executive leaders are hesitant to talk
about operations. Most noticeably are the research results for Research Questions 3 and
5 that refer to operations and mistakes being made. Participants did not want to say
things that were disparaging to military healthcare. There appears to be a sense of pride
and loyalty to represent the military of the highest respect. Additionally, on many
occasions, it was noted that during the interviews, the research participants would
repeatably make statements that were clearly their own personal opinions and not a
representation of the military or its culture.
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Conclusions
The researcher came to four conclusions that are based on the literature
supporting this study and its findings. These conclusions present significant insight on
leadership strategies that military hospital executive leaders use to engage hospital staff
in implementation of an HRO.
Conclusion 1: Understanding the Importance of Executive Leaders’ Experiences
and the Invaluable Insight They Provide for Implementing HRO
Based on the findings, executive leaders are vital to the process of implementing
HROs within military hospitals. Executive leaders bring much insight from having
worked for years within the constructs of healthcare and the military. The institutional
knowledge and experience they have is invaluable. Executive leaders have themselves
experienced much during their careers and are familiar with the many different change
models needed to implement major change initiatives like an HRO. The findings in this
study show that the utilization of past experiences and the highlights of past failures are a
couple ways that executive leaders are able to develop strategies to implement and
maintain HROs.
Conclusion 2: Analyzing Mistakes Made Within an HRO Help Executive Leaders
Promote Resiliency
Based on the findings, mistakes, errors, failures, and accidents will happen in
military hospitals no matter what executive leaders do to prevent them. The HRO is all
about becoming zero error, which is highly difficult given that preventative measures of
mistakes capture potential mistakes. Identifying potential mistakes often means placing
blame or highlighting a leader or staff faults. That being said, the findings point toward
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the need for executive leaders to promote resiliency. Resiliency helps reinforce all of the
HRO principles. The promotion of resiliency will help to empower staff and show trust
that it is okay to make mistakes while addressing the daily challenges faced with working
in healthcare.
Conclusion 3: Analyzing Policies May Provide Other Executive Leaders With
Insight on How to Prevent Errors
Based on the findings, policies help leaders not make the same mistakes again.
They provide a lot of insight on the issues that plague hospitals and provide solution to
them as well. Polices are the reason that there are many healthcare regulatory agencies
and associations that help set the gold standard in healthcare. Executive leaders can learn
much by reviewing policies at all levels of their organizations and help hospitals to keep
them striving to be error free.
Conclusion 4: Understanding the Importance of Continual Education and Sticking
with the HRO Principles
Based on the findings, the importance of continuing to follow HRO principles
using the various strategies is important. Sticking to the HRO principles is foundational
for leaders and staff to understand the catastrophic nature of what not following them can
be. Through continual education, more knowledge of errors or mistakes can be shared.
This means that more solutions are found and the same errors or mistakes are prevented
from happening again.
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Implications for Action
Based on the findings of the study and the review of literature, the researcher is
recommending that senior executive leaders working in military hospitals apply the
following actions to assist with implementing and maintaining an HRO.
1. Analyze the resources the hospital requires to sustain an HRO
2. Develop a peer-support program
3. Develop a training program for new hospital leaders and staff
4. Designate an organizational development leader
Each of the strategies is discussed in further detail in the following sections.
Implication for Action 1: Resources Required to Sustain HRO
Every HRO requires a large commitment of resources in order to implement and
maintain. Executive leaders need to analyze how the commitment of resources impacts
them and as to whether their hospitals can effectively implement. Analyzing the
resources required for sustaining HRO time, cost, and manpower needs to be accessed. It
is important to know that not all organizations that have inherit risk like hospitals follow
an HRO model. Therefore, executive leaders need to do a thorough assessment of the
resources they have and are able to commit to the sustainability of an HRO.
Implication for Action 2: Peer Support Program
A peer support program is needed for every HRO. Peer support programs present
a means for leaders and staff to help each another. The healthcare industry poses many
challenges for those that work in it every day. While an HRO demands the need for
resiliency as fundamental, the ability to bounce back after something does not go as
planned may be more easily achieved if there are peers to support each another.
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Moreover, a peer support program will provide additional support and stability to leaders
and staff to share their experiences with one another.
Implication for Action 3: HRO Training Program
A HRO training program needs to be established in every HRO. HRO training
programs provide all leaders and staff in a hospital with a basic understanding of HRO.
HRO is not something that is learned or adopted overnight. It is just as complex as the
inner workings of a hospital. Just knowing that a training program is available for those
that have never worked in an HRO will help. It is important to train and learn from past
mistakes to not repeat them. The purpose of an HRO is about being error free, and
training is the best place to start learning about policies or experts that can help prevent
errors.
Implication for Action 4: Organizational Development Leader
HRO Hospitals need to have an organizational development leader. This leader’s
sole responsibility is to have institutional knowledge, to learn strategy and practices to
overcome impediments, and to foster leader and staff behaviors that ensure proven
results. By having an organizational development leader, HRO hospitals can designate
this leader to focus on ensuring that all six of the HRO principles are being continually
socialized and prioritized. An organizational development leader is skilled at providing
training and continual education to improve patient safety, and high-quality care is
achieved through the hospital’s Just Culture. Just Culture in organizations are staff who
learn and improve by freely identifying and examining their own weaknesses (Frankel et
al., 2006). A Just Culture aligns with HRO because it provokes working professional
diversity enhancements that are error detection and problem-solving sources. Lastly, an
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organizational development leader spearheads all major change initiatives to ensure that
the organizational needs are being met by design and the implementation and evaluation
processes promote professional development and continual learning for all within the
hospital.
Recommendations for Further Research
This study focused on senior executive leaders and the strategies they used in the
implementation of HROs in their hospitals. The results of this study and the literature
both suggested that there are a number strategies that could be used in implementing
HRO principles, and finding the right strategies for leaders to use is certainly difficult
given the lack of resources.
Recommendation 1
It is recommended that a qualitative study explore how first line leaders
implement and maintain an HRO within military hospitals. In the military, healthcare
professionals are expected to lead because they are often seen as the glue that keeps a unit
together operationally. It will be interesting to learn about the strategies first line leaders
used given the fact that they lack the experiences senior executive leaders hold.
Therefore, further studies can help to shed light on just how an HRO is implemented at
all levels of a military hospital.
Recommendation 2
It is recommended that a qualitative study explore how senior executive leaders
implement and maintain an HRO within a similar military healthcare system of hospitals.
Many studies have been conducted on HROs throughout various industries, but the
studies tend to focus on the process of an HRO. It will be interesting to learn more about
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how an HRO works in different military hospitals. Further studies on this topic will
prove informative for the continued growth and innovation of military healthcare.
Recommendation 3
It is recommended that a correlational study be conducted to examine the
strategies used by executive leaders implementing and maintaining HROs in military and
civilian hospitals. The study could compare senior executive leaders with more than 20
years of experience working in healthcare and have been vital in the implementation and
maintenance of an HRO in a hospital. A comparison of strategies used could be
examined.
Recommendation 4
It is recommended that a phenomenological study be conducted that examines the
lived experiences and perceptions of leaders who have worked in both hospitals that have
implemented HROs and hospitals that have not. Examining leaders who have worked in
both hospital environments with differing strategies for operating could provide insights
into the key leadership fundamentals needed to lead a hospital successfully.
Recommendation 5
It is recommended that a replicated qualitative case study be completed on only
one of the military hospitals in the Puget Sound Military Health System. Contrasting the
senior executive leaders experience with that of the senior executive leaders from a
different branch of the military could demonstrate whether the strategies discussed in this
study are unique to all senior executive leaders.
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Recommendation 6
It is recommended that a phenomenological study be conducted that examines the
lived experiences and perceptions of leaders who have worked in both hospitals that have
implemented HROs and other industries that have implemented HROs. It will be
interesting to learn more about how an HRO works in different industries compared to
hospitals. One could gain direct knowledge of strategies, obstacles, and barriers other
industries used to devise techniques and new strategies to improve the way healthcare is
delivered.
Concluding Remarks and Reflections
Military hospitals are not much different than other hospitals given the fact that
their mission is to take care of those that are injured or ill. It is eye-opening to learn
about the errors and mistakes that happen in hospitals every day. Executive leaders of
hospitals are charged with responsibility to ensure that safe, quality, patient care is
happening every moment and that when it is not, it is addressed. Hospitals are known to
make mistakes. I discovered that it is all about how executive leaders learn from their
mistakes and prevent them from happening again.
The HRO has six principles that executive leaders must implement using various
strategies. It was surprising to see how much resources go into implementing an HRO.
Executive leaders have a daunting task when it comes to engaging staff with the
implementation of all six principles of an HRO. From my own experience, all of the
HRO principles bring value to hospitals but may not be required if lessons are learned
and the overall organizational vision and values are shared. I found that most staff and
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healthcare professionals went into the industry to help patients, not cause catastrophic
errors or mistakes therefore sharing the desire of a strong safety culture.
I was incredibly surprised to see a disparity in the different strategies used by
executive leaders implementing the HRO principles. It appeared as if leaders focused on
certain HRO principles opposed to others. From my own experience, it can be extremely
easy to get honed in on particular topics in healthcare that have “buzz words” in them. I
believe that the strategies used by executive leaders in this study may influence the way
going forward when it comes to keeping all of the HRO principles at the top of
everyone’s mind.
I am hopeful that future military healthcare executive leaders are able to learn
from the errors and mistakes that their predecessors have made. I believe that all future
leaders in healthcare will be able to forge success from the lessons learned of those that
have come before them. It is difficult enough to try to prevent all errors from happening,
let alone during the COVID-19 global pandemic, as healthcare leaders tried to do during
this unexpected plague that exhausted hospitals throughout 2020. However, the goal of
being error free for all hospitals must continue to be sought after.
In the end, I was very pleased with how this study turned out, and I hope that it
brings value to everyone who is looking to learn about HROs, to both those people who
work in healthcare and to those who do not. HROs can help people become cognizant
with the errors or potential errors they may make to stop them before they become
catastrophic or even cost people their lives.
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APPENDIX B
Interview Protocol And Questions
Interview Date: _________________
Interviewee Name: __________________________
Welcome and Purpose of Interview
Thank you for agreeing to take time out of your day to interview with me. My name is
Russell Phillips IV and I am a doctoral candidate at University of Massachusetts Global
who is finishing their degree in the area of Organizational Leadership. I also work at
Madigan Army Medical Center as an Administrative Officer within the Department of
Behavioral Health, leading a number of behavioral health clinics and wards who serve
our men and women in uniform. I believe it is our duty to serve and protect as leaders in
military medicine which helps conserve to the fighting strength of our military.
I will be conducting approximately three interviews with others like yourself who have
held executive leadership positions in military hospitals that have implemented High
Reliability Organizational (HRO) initiatives.
Informed Consent
Thank you again for your willingness to participate in this study. Any information that is
obtained in connection to this study will remain confidential. All of the data will be
reported without reference to your name or any institution with which you are connected.
After I record and transcribe the data, I will send it to you via email so you can check to
make sure I have accurately captured your thoughts and ideas.
We have scheduled approximately 45 minutes to an hour for the interview. At any point
during the interview you may ask that I skip a particular question or stop the interview
altogether. For ease of our discussion and accuracy I will record our conversation as
indicated in the Informed Consent. Please take a moment to read through the form and
sign showing your consent. [Interviewee to sign the consent form].
Demographic Questions
1. What is your age?
o
o
o
o
o
o

18 – 29 years old
30 – 39 years old
40 – 49 years old
50 – 59 years old
60 – 65 years old
Other
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2. What is your ethnicity?
o
o
o
o
o
o

White
Hispanic or Latino
Black or African American
Native American
Asian
Other

3. Please specify your educational background?
o
o
o
o
o

Bachelor's degree (BA or BS)
Master's degree (MA or MS)
Doctorate degree (PhD, EdD, PsyD, etc)
Medical degree (MD or DO)
Other

4. Please specify your number of years of military experience?
o
o
o
o
o

10 – 15 years
16 – 20 years
21 – 25 years
26 – 30 years
Other

Background Questions
1. What is the current or past position that you held at a military hospital? How long
did you hold that position?
2. Tell me a little bit about your leadership role and responsibilities within that
position?
3. When did you first hear about the HRO initiative?
4. When did the implementation of HRO begin in your military hospital?
Implementation of HRO
1. Please tell me how you came to be involved in the implementation of HRO in
your military hospital?
2. What was your involvement in the implementation of HRO?
3. What motivated you to be involved in the implementation of HRO?
4. How did your organization respond to the change with respect to HRO planning
and implementation?
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5. How did each HRO principle get implemented and what strategies were used to
implement them?
1. How did the principle preoccupied with failure get implemented?
2. How did the principle commit to resiliency get implemented?
3. How did the principle sensitive to operations get implemented?
4. How did the principle deference to expertise get implemented?
5. How did the principle reluctant to accept simple explanations for problems
get implemented?
6. How did the principle create a strong safety culture get implemented?
6. What changes did you make, personally or professionally, in relation to the
implementation of HRO in your organization?
7. What successes can you share about the implementation
8. What difference, if any, do you notice in senior leaders?
9. What difference, if any, do you notice in all staff?
10. What are some of the challenges you have encountered with implementing HRO?
Change Process in Becoming an HRO
1. What barriers did you encounter in the implementation process?
2. How did leaders create a sense of urgency in implementing HRO?
3. How were leaders brought together to implement HRO?
4. How was the vision for HRO developed and communicated to staff?
5. How were leaders and staff empowered to implement HRO?
6. What were the early quick wins recognized?
7. How were improvements implemented during the HRO process?
8. How have the HRO changes been institutionalized?
9. How would you say diversity relates to the HRO initiative?
10. What barriers were encountered during the HRO process?
11. How were the barriers managed?
Closing Statement
Thank you very much for taking the time out of your today to allow me to interview you.
Your support in my dissertation journey is deeply appreciated. These are all the questions
I have for you at this time. I will be more than happy to provide you a copy of my
research once it has been concluded and published.
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APPENDIX C
Interview Critique by Participants
As a doctoral candidate and researcher at University of Massachusetts Global your assistance
is so appreciated in designing this interview instrument. Your participation is crucial to the
development of a valid and reliable instrument.
Below are some questions that I appreciate your answering after completing the interview. Your
answers will assist me in refining both the directions and the interview items.
You have been provided with a paper copy of the interview, to remind you of the questions asked
in case it is needed.
1. How many minutes did it take you to complete the interview, from the moment the
researcher spoke until closing? _____________________________________________
2. Did the researcher ask for you to read the consent information and sign the agreement
before the interview began concern you at all? _________________________ If so,
would you briefly state your concern
_____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
3. Was the Introduction sufficiently clear (and not too long) to inform you what the research
was about? ______ If not, what would you recommend that would make it better?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
4. Were the directions clear, and you understood what to do? ________________________
If not, would you briefly state the problem
___________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
5. Were the interview questions clear, appropriate, and easy to understand? ______ If not,
briefly describe the problem
_______________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
6. As you progressed through the interview, were their questions that arose as to why the
question asked was necessary or further explanation was needed regarding the question?
_______________ If so, would you briefly state so and the interview questions of
concern (please highlight the questions on the interview paper given or state the # here)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Additional Comments:
______________________________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX D
Interview Observer Feedback Reflection Questions
Conducting interviews is a learned skill set/experience. Gaining valuable insight about
your interview skills and affect with the interview will support your data gathering when
interviewing the actual participants. As the researcher you should reflect on the questions
below after completing the interview. You should also discuss the following reflection
questions with your ‘observer’ after completing the interview field test. The questions are
written from your perspective as the interviewer. Provide your observer with a copy of
these reflective questions prior to the field test interview. Then you can verbalize your
thoughts with the observer and they can add valuable insight from their observation.
After completing this process, you may have edits or changes to recommend for the
interview protocol before finalizing.
1. How long did the interview take?

Did the time seem to be appropriate?

2. Were the questions clear or were there places when the interviewee was
unclear?
3. Where there any words or terms used during the interview that were
unclear or confusing?
4. How did you feel during the interview? Comfortable? Nervous? For the
observer: how did you perceive the interviewer in regards to the preceding
descriptors?
5. Did you feel prepared to conduct the interview? Is there something you
could have done to be better prepared? For the observer: how did you
perceive the interviewer in regards to the preceding descriptors?
6. What parts of the interview went the most smoothly and why do you think
that was the case?
7. Are there parts of the interview that seemed to be awkward and why do you think
that was the case?
8. If you were to change any part of the interview, what would it be and how would
you change it?
9. What suggestions do you have for improving the overall process?

Additional Comments:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX E
Research Participant Bill of Rights

UMASS GLOBAL UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
Research Participant’s Bill of Rights
Any person who is requested to consent to participate as a subject in an experiment,
or who is requested to consent on behalf of another, has the following rights:
1.

To be told what the study is attempting to discover.

2. To be told what will happen in the study and whether any of the procedures,
drugs or devices are different from what would be used in standard practice.
3. To be told about the risks, side effects or discomforts of the things that may
happen to him/her.
4. To be told if he/she can expect any benefit from participating and, if so, what the
benefits might be.
5. To be told what other choices he/she has and how they may be better or worse
than being in the study.
6.

To be allowed to ask any questions concerning the study both before agreeing to
be involved and during the course of the study.

7.

To be told what sort of medical treatment is available if any complications arise.

8. To refuse to participate at all before or after the study is started without any
adverse effects.
9. To receive a copy of the signed and dated consent form.
10. To be free of pressures when considering whether he/she wishes to agree to
be in the study.
If at any time you have questions regarding a research study, you should ask
the researchers to answer them. You also may contact the UMASS GLOBAL
Institutional Review Board, which is concerned with the protection of volunteers
in research projects. The UM
G
Institutional Review Board may be
contacted either by telephoning the Office of Academic Affairs at (949) 341-9937 or
by writing to the Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs, UMASS GLOBAL, 16355 Laguna
Canyon Road, Irvine, CA, 92618.

UMass Global IRB

Adopted
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APPENDIX F
NIH’s Protecting Human Research Participants Certification

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural
Research certifies that Russell Phillips successfully completed the
NIH Web-based training course "Protecting Human Research
Participants."

Date of Completion: 05/18/2018

Certification Number: 2821526

137

APPENDIX G
Principal Request to Participate Letter
Good Morning Dr. XXX
I am a doctoral candidate at University of Massachusetts Global finishing my doctorate in
Organizational Leadership. I am conducting a dissertation study that will explore and
explain the leadership strategies that military hospital executive leaders use to engage
hospital staff in implementation of the six principles of High Reliability Organizations
(HROs). This study will fill the gap in the research regarding military hospital leadership
experiences in initiating and implementing High Reliability Organization (HRO)
initiatives in military hospitals. The results of this study may assist hospital executive
leaders with leadership engagement and the processes of implementing effective change
programs for future military hospitals implementing HRO and healthcare industry as a
whole. This study may also provide much needed information and data for military
hospitals to continue to improve, strong leadership is needed to manage the change
development of HRO initiatives in military hospitals.
I am asking for your assistance in the study by participating in an interview which will
take from 45-60 minutes and will be set up at a time that is convenient for you. If you
agree to participate in an interview, you will be assured that it will be completely
confidential. No names will be attached to any notes or records from the interview. All
information will remain in locked files accessible only to the researcher. No one from
your organization will have access to the information obtained during the interview. You
will be free to stop the interview and withdraw from the study at any time.
I am available to answer questions via telephone xxx-xxx-xxxx or via email at
rphilli2@mail.umassglobal.edu, to answer any questions you may have.
Please let me know if you are willing to consider being a part of this study. Your
participation would be greatly valued.
Very Respectfully,
Russell Phillips IV, MA
Doctoral Candidate Bradman University in Organizational Leadership
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APPENDIX H
Informed Consent
Information About: Leadership Engagement for Military Hospitals: A case study of the
effects of executive leader engagement in military hospitals that have become high
reliability organizations.
Responsible Investigator: Russell Phillips IV, MA.
Purpose Of Study: You are being asked to participate in a research study conducted by
Russell Phillips IV, MA, a doctoral candidate from the School of Education at University
of Massachusetts Global. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and
explain the leadership strategies that military hospital executive leaders use to engage
hospital staff in implementation of the six principles of High Reliability Organizations
(HROs). This study will fill the gap in the research regarding military hospital leadership
experiences in initiating and implementing High Reliability Organization (HRO)
initiatives in military hospitals. The results of this study may assist hospital executive
leaders with leadership engagement and the processes of implementing effective change
programs for future military hospitals implementing HRO and healthcare industry as a
whole. This study may also provide much needed information and data for military
hospitals to continue to improve, strong leadership is needed to manage the change
development of HRO initiatives in military hospitals.
By participating in this study, I agree to participate in an individual interview. The
interview will last approximately 45 – 60 minutes and will be conducted in person,
telephonically, or by skype. Completion of the individual interview will take place March
through April 2021.
I understand that:
a) There are minimal risks associated with participating in this research. I understand that
the Investigator will protect my confidentiality by storing any research materials
collected during the interview process in a locked file drawer in which only the
researcher has access to.
b) I understand that the interview will be audio recorded. The recordings will be available
only to the researcher and the professional transcriptionist. The audio recordings will be
used to capture the interview dialogue and to ensure the accuracy of the information
collected during the interview. All information will be identifier-redacted and my
confidentiality will be maintained. Upon completion of the study all recordings will be
destroyed. All other data and consents will be securely stored for three years after
completion of data collection and confidentially shredded or fully deleted.
c) The possible benefit of this study to me is that my input may help add to the research
regarding leadership engagement in HRO hospitals and their ability to implement change
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processes that developing and maintain in future executive hospital leaders. The findings
will be available to me at the conclusion of the study and will provide new insights about
the leadership experience in which I participated. I understand that I will not be
compensated for my participation.
d) If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact
Russell Phillips IV at rphilli2@mail.umassglobal.edu or by phone at xxx-xxx-xxxx or Dr.
Jalin B. Johnson (Advisor) at jbrooks@umassglobal.edu.
e) My participation in this research study is voluntary. I may decide to not participate in
the study and I can withdraw at any time. I can also decide not to answer particular
questions during the interview if I so choose. I understand that I may refuse to participate
or may withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences. Also,
the Investigator may stop the study at any time.
f) No information that identifies me will be released without my separate consent and that
all identifiable information will be protected to the limits allowed by law. If the study
design or the use of the data is to be changed, I will be so informed and my consent reobtained. I understand that if I have any questions, comments, or concerns about the
study or the informed consent process, I may write or call the Office of the Vice
Chancellor of Academic Affairs, University of Massachusetts Global, at 16355 Laguna
Canyon Road, Irvine, CA 92618, (949) 341-7641.
I acknowledge that I have received a copy of this form and the Research participant’s Bill
of Rights. I have read the above and understand it and hereby consent to the procedure(s)
set forth.
_____________________________________

________________

Signature of Participant of Responsible Party

Date

_____________________________________

________________

Signature of Principle Investigator

Date
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